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TRIPS AGREEMENT:  TOWARDS A 
BETTER PROTECTION FOR 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS? 
José Manuel Cortés Martín1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
eographical Indications (GIs) are intellectual property 
rights.2  Like trademarks or commercial names, GIs are 
distinctive signs which permit the identification of products on 
the market.  They do not, however, protect products or produc-
tion methods as such, but, rather, confer to all producers from a 
given geographical area the exclusive right to use a distinctive 
sign to identify their products if they possess a given quality, 
reputation, or other characteristic attributable to their geo-
graphical origins.3  
Prior to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS or the TRIPS Agreement), source 
indications with geographical significance comprised two cate-
gories: appellations of origin and indications of source.  Appella-
  
 1. Associate Professor of International Law at the Universidad Pablo de 
Olavide in Sevilla (Spain). L.M. in European Community Law (Maitrîse en 
Droit Européen), Institut d’Études Européens Fernand Dehousse, Université 
de Liège (Belgium). Doctorate in Public International Law from the Universi-
dad Pablo de Olavide.  Visiting Professor at the Law School Texas Tech Uni-
versity during the summer of 2003. 
 2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, art. 
1.2, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS] (“For the purposes of this Agree-
ment, the term ‘intellectual property’ refers to all categories of intellectual prop-
erty that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II.”).  Section 3 of TRIPS 
refers to Geographical Indications.  TRIPS came into force in 1995, and had 
effect in developed countries – including the United States – as of January 1, 
1996. Developing countries, however, had until January 1, 2000 to comply with 
the TRIPS standards with respect to GIs and the least-developed countries have 
until January 1, 2006 to comply.     
 3. Historically, GIs have been given various definitions, but TRIPS de-
fines them as, “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory 
of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, 
reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin.”  Id. art. 22.1. 
G 
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tions of origin signify not only the geographical region from 
which products originate but also specific features of the prod-
ucts which result from the natural and human factors in their 
particular locale.4  Indications of source merely state where the 
product was made.5  The TRIPS Agreement created a single 
category for such indications, GIs, which is broader than indica-
tions of source, but does not incorporate the natural and human 
factors of appellations of origin.6  For purposes of this discus-
sion, the TRIPS definition of GIs is the most relevant.  GIs are 
instruments designed to protect a product’s reputation7 and dif-
fer from patents and copyrights in that they are not specifically 
designed to reward innovation.8  Rather, they reward producers 
situated in a certain region who follow production practices and 
customs associated with that region.9  GIs reward goodwill and 
reputation created or built up by a group of producers over 
  
 4. See Daniel Hangard, Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indi-
cations in France and in the European Union, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION (WIPO) SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS: MELBOURNE, APRIL 5–6, 1995, 65, 67 (1995) [here-
inafter Symposium 1995]; Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations 
of Origin and their International Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 
205, reprinted in 3 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED 
RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, 1954 (1975), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo012en.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) 
[hereinafter Lisbon Agreement]. 
 5. See F. Addor & A. Grazzioli, Geographical Indications Beyond Wines 
and Spirits – A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical Indications 
in the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 5 J. OF WORLD INTEL. PROP. 865, 867 (2002) 
(defining an indication as, “any expression or sign used to indicate that a 
product or a service originates in a country, region, or a specific place without 
any element of quality or reputation”). 
 6. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.1 (“Geographical indicators are, for 
purposes of this Agreement, indications which identify a good as originating 
in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a 
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially at-
tributable to its geographical origin.”). 
 7. See id. art. 22.2. 
 8. A patent for an invention is the grant of a property right to the inven-
tor, issued by the Patent Office.  Id. art. 27.  A copyright is the legal right 
granted to an artist, author, computer user, musician, playwright, publisher, 
or distributor to exclusive publication, production, sale, or distribution of a 
literary, musical, dramatic, or artistic work. Id. art. 9.   
 9. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.1. 
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many years and, in this sense, operate to maintain traditional 
knowledge and practices.10   
GIs benefit consumers by providing reliable information and 
assurances of authenticity11 and, if used in a proper, well-
protected way, can become effective marketing tools of great 
economic value.12  Indeed, GIs convey the cultural identity of 
nations and regions and make it possible to add value to a coun-
try’s natural riches and to its population’s skills.13  In order for 
these benefits to become a reality, it is necessary to protect GIs 
at the international level.   
Historically, GIs have received little international protection.  
Before 1994, the protection of GIs in international fora was lim-
ited to three international instruments under the auspices of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): the Paris 
Convention;14 the Madrid Agreement;15 and the Lisbon Agree-
ment.16  The Paris Convention is a widely-recognized interna-
tional agreement, while the other two suffer from limited mem-
bership.17  It was during the Uruguay Round18 that trade in in-
  
 10. An example of traditional knowledge is the Turmeric (Curcuma longa), 
a plant in the ginger family yielding saffron-coloured rhizomes used as a spice 
for flavouring Indian cooking.  It also has properties that make it an effective 
ingredient in medicines and cosmetics and as a color dye.  As a medicine, it is 
traditionally used to heal wounds and rashes.  See Shubha Ghosh, Globaliza-
tion, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 73, 93–94 
(2003). 
 11. See Paul J. Heald, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Explor-
ing the Contours of the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 655 
(1996). 
 12. See Michael Maher, On Vino Veritas?  Clarifying the Use of Geographic 
References on American Wine Labels, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1881, 1885–86 (2001). 
 13. Lori E. Simon, Appellations of Origin: The Continuing Controversy, 5 
NW. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 132, 132 (1983). 
 14. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo. 
int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]. 
 15. Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False and Deceptive Indica-
tions of Source, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 168, available at http://www. 
wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo032en.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2004) [hereinafter 
Madrid Agreement]. 
 16. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4.  
 17. As of September 24, 2004, only thirty-four States are members of the 
Madrid Agreement.  A list of those Members is published on the WIPO web-
site, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/word/f-mdrd-o.doc (last 
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tangibles was included, for the first time, in multilateral trade 
negotiations, resulting in, among others, the TRIPS Agreement, 
which technically is Annex C of the treaty that created the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  TRIPS covers a broad range 
of intellectual property rights19 and regulates the availability, 
scope, and use of these intangible assets.20  The inclusion of GIs 
caused heated debates during the Uruguay Round and contin-
ues to generate discussion between the new and old world.21  
Like many aspects of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the dis-
agreement among Members impeded the creation of a complete 
system for the international protection of GIs.   
Regrettably, compared to other intellectual property rights, 
protection of GIs at the international level remains inadequate.  
In addition to the legal uncertainty that TRIPS provisions con-
tinue to generate, many countries feel that the current level of 
protection provided for GIs fails to prevent free-riding on the 
reputation of genuine GIs.22  WTO Negotiators in the Uruguay 
  
visited Oct. 19, 2004).  As of October 4, 2004, only twenty-two States are mem-
bers of the Lisbon Agreement. A list of the Members of the Lisbon Agreement 
is published on the WIPO website, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ 
documents/pdf/j-lisbon.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). 
 18. The World Trade Organization is the outcome of a "negotiating" pro-
cess – the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations – launched by 
Ministers of GATT Members, who met at a Special Session of the GATT Con-
tracting Parties at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986.  The negotia-
tions and process ended with the signing of the Final Act of the Marrakesh 
Agreement in April 1994 at Marrakesh, Morocco.  
 19. See TRIPS, supra note 2 (the intellectual property rights covered by the 
TRIPS Agreement are Copyright and Related Rights, Trademarks, Industrial 
Designs, Patents, Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits, Pro-
tection of Undisclosed Information, and Control of Anti-Competitive Practices 
in Contractual Licenses). 
 20. See id. arts. 22, 63. 
 21. See Jorg Reinbothe & Anthony Howard, The State of Play in the Nego-
tiations on TRIPS (GATT/Uruguay Round), 13 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 157, 
161 (1991).  On the one hand, some European countries, representing the old 
world, have a long tradition of protecting this type of intellectual property.  
On the other hand, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 
among others, representing the new world, have not historically had separate 
laws to protect GIs, apart from their respective systems of trademarks. 
 22. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from Bulgaria, Cuba, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the European Communities and their Member 
States, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauri-
tius, Pakistan, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzer-
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Round were conscious of these deficiencies and, thus, mandated 
ongoing negotiations to continue the commitment toward im-
proving intellectual property rights.23  One of these areas is ne-
gotiations concerning the establishment of a multilateral sys-
tem of GI notification and registration.24  These negotiations 
began in 1995 and have yet to produce any real results.  While 
some countries are in favor of granting further GI protection, 
others wish to maintain the status quo.  
The purpose of this Article is, first, to describe how the WTO 
strives to secure effective protection for GIs, and, second, to ex-
plore the prospects for further development based upon these 
ongoing negotiations.  In order to accomplish these objectives, 
the Article must first review the international protection of GIs 
prior to and under the TRIPS Agreement, followed by reviews 
and critiques of the various proposals for a multilateral system 
of registration set forth during negotiations.  Next, the Article 
considers the appropriateness of expanding the system to estab-
lish additional protection for products other than wines and 
spirits.  The Article then concludes by arguing in favor of fur-
ther GI protection and for WTO Members to shoulder their re-
sponsibility by providing greater protection for GIs.  Doing so 
ensures that TRIPS remains an effective multinational treaty 
and sets an example for compliance by other Members.  This 
compliance would be particularly helpful for developing coun-
tries which are becoming aware that products identified with 
their country, or a given region within their country, can con-
tribute mightily to their economic development. 
II. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 
PRIOR TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
As stated in Section I, prior to the TRIPS Agreement, the 
Paris Convention,25 Madrid Agreement,26 and Lisbon Agree-
  
land, Thailand and Turkey, IP/C/W/353 (June 24, 2002) (Doc #02-3484), 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. 
 23. See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 23.4, 24.1, 24.2. See also Frederick M. 
Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the 
TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165, 166 (2000) (citing negotiation for 
GI protections as a “Built-In Agenda” item that remains before the TRIPS 
Council).  
 24. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 23.4.  
 25. Paris Convention, supra note 14.  
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ment27 were the only noteworthy international treaties which 
provided GI protection.  Unfortunately, the Paris Convention 
suffered from vagueness in terms of GIs, while the Madrid and 
Lisbon Agreements suffered from limited memberships. 
A. The Paris Convention 
Undoubtedly, the Paris Convention became the most impor-
tant treaty adopted in the late nineteenth century because it 
influenced intellectual property laws adopted by many coun-
tries throughout the twentieth century.28  This treaty was the 
first multilateral agreement to provide protection for GIs, al-
though it was rather general and weak when compared to the 
protections afforded by the TRIPS Agreement.29  
The Paris Convention’s large number of Member States 
agreed mainly to border measures for false indications without 
defining the conditions for protection.30  Under the Paris Con-
  
 26. Madrid Agreement, supra note 15.  
 27. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4.  
 28. The Paris Convention was agreed to in 1883 and was complemented by 
the Madrid Protocol of 1891.  It was further revised in Brussels (1900), Wash-
ington (1911), The Hague (1925), London (1934), Lisbon (1958), Stockholm 
(1967), and amended in 1979.  The Paris Convention, as of August 25, 2004, 
had 168 signatory states.  The complete list of signatory countries, as of July 
15, 2004 is available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/d-
paris.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2004).  Up to the last decade, the history of the 
Paris Convention has been the history of international harmonization of in-
dustrial property laws and procedures.  The 1883 Paris Convention laid the 
foundation for this movement.  See Friedrich-Karl Beier, One Hundred Years 
of International Cooperation – The Role of the Paris Convention in the Past, 
Present and Future, 15 INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. AND COPYRIGHT L. 1 (1984) 
(stating that “[t]he Paris Convention became the basic instrument for the 
protection of inventions, industrial designs trademarks and trade names, and 
for the protection against unfair competition on a worldwide level”).  Typical 
for the time, the movement for extension and harmonization of the regimes for 
the protection of industrial property had its origins in industrialized Europe.  
The accession to the Convention by other countries shows how quickly the 
ideals of the Convention spread eastward. 
 29. See generally JOSÉ MANUEL CORTÉS MARTÍN, LA PROTECCIÓN DE LAS 
INDICACIONES GEOGRÁFICAS EN EL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL E INTRACOMUN- 
ITARIO, 125–30 (2003). 
 30. See Albrecht Conrad, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the 
TRIPS Agreement, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 11, 28 (1996) (stating that the Paris 
Convention has more than a hundred members, but does not contain substan-
tial provisions for the protection of GIs). 
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vention, Members must seize or prohibit imports with false in-
dications of source, producer, manufacturer, or merchant.31  In 
its original form, Members acted only in cases of serious fraud.32 
Article 10 of the Paris Convention mandates the seizure of 
goods in cases of “direct or indirect use of a false indication of 
the [source of the good or the] identity of the producer, manu-
facturer or merchant....”33  In 1958, Article 10bis(3) was added to 
prohibit indications that were “liable to mislead the public as to 
the nature, the manufacturing process, the characteristics, the 
suitability for their purpose, or the quantity of the goods.”34  
Significantly, the word “characteristics” replaced the phrase 
“the origin.”35  This provision serves as the basis for protection 
against misleading GIs.  However, the Paris Convention fails to 
provide any remedies in case of infringement of this provision. 
B. The Madrid Agreement 
The Madrid Agreement provides specific rules for the repres-
sion of false and deceptive indications of source, thus exceeding 
the level of protection given to GIs by the Paris Convention.36  
Members having signed this agreement agree mainly to imple-
ment border measures and prevent the dilution of GIs into ge-
neric terms.37  
  
 31. Paris Convention, supra note 14, arts. 9, 10. 
 32. See Louis C. Lenzen, Bacchus in the Hinterlands: A Study of Denomi-
nations of Origin in French and American Wine Labeling Laws, 58 
TRADEMARK REP. 145, 184 (1968).  
 33. Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 10.  
 34. Id. art. 10bis.  
 35. In the Lisbon Conference, the Austrian Delegation proposed to reform 
Art. 10bis of the Paris Convention, including the word “origin,” so that GIs 
were protected by this disposition.  However, the firm opposition of the United 
States prevented this reform. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, 3 PATENTS, TRADEMARKS 
AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 1579 (1975).  
 36. Madrid Agreement, supra note 15, art. 1(1) (“All goods bearing a false 
or deceptive indication by which one of the countries to which this Agreement 
applies, or a place situated therein, is directly or indirectly indicated as being 
the country or place of origin shall be seized on importation into any of the 
said countries.”). 
 37. Over time, some product names on product labels have become generic 
and are used regardless of place of origin. See Council Regulation on the Pro-
tection of Geographical Indication and Designations of Origin for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs (EEC) N. 2081/92 (July 14, 1992), art. 3, reprinted in 
208 EUR. COMMUNITY OFFICIAL J. 1 (defining generic terms as “the name of an 
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The Madrid Agreement was amended in 1934 by adding Arti-
cle 3bis, which prohibits the use of false representations on the 
product itself and in advertising or other forms of public an-
nouncements.38  In addition to providing more specific protec-
tion, the Madrid Agreement included controversial areas of pro-
tection, most significantly Article 4, which prohibits Members 
from treating GIs of wines as generic terms.39  However, few 
states signed the Madrid Agreement due largely to its expan-
sive view of GI protection; several Paris Convention Members 
preferred to enter into bilateral agreements with the purpose of 
protecting GIs internationally.40  Due to its weak support, the 
impact of the Madrid Agreement has been minimal. 
  
agricultural product or a foodstuff which, although it relates to the place or 
the region where this product or foodstuff was originally produced or mar-
keted, has become the common name of an agricultural product or a food-
stuff”), available at http://www.europa.eu.int.  
 38. Madrid Agreement, supra note 15, art. 3bis (“The countries to which 
this Agreement applies also undertake to prohibit the use, in connection with 
the sale or display or offering for sale of any goods, of all indications in the 
nature of publicity capable of deceiving the public as to the source of the 
goods, and appearing on signs, advertisements, invoices, wine lists, business 
letters or papers, or any other commercial communication.”). 
 39. Id. art. 4.  
 40. Bilateral and plurilateral (including regional) agreements may also 
serve the purpose of protecting GIs internationally.  A number of countries 
have already entered into these types of agreements.  These agreements can 
adopt the form of a specific treaty referring only to GIs by listing them, such 
as the agreement adopted by Germany and France in 1960 for the protection 
of indications of source, appellations of origin, and other geographical indica-
tions.  This became the model for numerous bilateral agreements signed by 
European countries.  See Roland Knaak, The Protection of Geographical Indi-
cations According to the TRIPs Agreement, 18 IIC STUDIES, STUDIES IN 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW, FROM GATT TO TRIPS – THE 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
117, 122–23 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996) (discussing 
bilateral agreements on indications of source).  Regional and bilateral agree-
ments in force which provide protection to GIs have been submitted to the 
Council for TRIPS according to Article 4(d) of the TRIPS Agreement.  See 
WTO Council for TRIPS, Note by the Secretariat, Overview of Existing Inter-
national Notification and Registration Systems for Geographical Indications 
Relating to Products other than Wines and Spirits, IP/C/W/85/Add.1 (July 2, 
1999) (Doc. # 99-2747), paras. 4–5, available at http://docsonline. 
wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. 
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C. The Lisbon Agreement  
The Lisbon Agreement was enacted in 1958 as an attempt to 
achieve effective and enforceable protection for appellations of 
origin.41  It provided for strict protection through an interna-
tional registration system42 and was modeled after the registra-
tion system for trademarks devised under the Madrid Agree-
ment Concerning the International Registration of Marks.43  
Signatories of the Lisbon Agreement were emphasizing that the 
protection of appellations of origins should be as comprehensive 
as those for trademarks.  The main feature of the Lisbon Agree-
ment is that appellations of origin are to be recognized and 
protected as such, both in the country of origin and registered 
at an agency of the WIPO.44  Article 1 states that once an 
appellation of origin is registered, it is to be protected in other 
Member countries.45  According to Article 3, the Members must 
prohibit imitations under their respective domestic laws, in-
cluding the use of terms as “like,” “type,” or “style,” which may 
be used along with the indication.46  Article 6 provides that no 
appellation of origin can be considered generic in any other 
Member country, so long as it is protected in the country of ori-
gin.47  However, such strict protection would require a change of 
national laws for many non-Member countries.48  Because of its 
strict protection and lack of flexibility, the Lisbon Agreement 
has few signatories.49 
  
 41. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4. 
 42. Id. art. 5.   
 43. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of 
Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389.  This Agreement was revised in 
Brussels (Dec. 14, 1900), Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1911), The Hague (Nov. 6, 
1925), London (June 2, 1934), Nice (June 15, 1957), Stockholm (July 14, 1967), 
and amended one final time (Sept. 28, 1979). 
 44. Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5. 
 45. Id. art. 1.  
 46. Id. art. 3.  
 47. Id. art. 6.  
 48. Conrad, supra note 30, at 26 (citing this as one of various reasons more 
countries did not sign onto the Agreement).  
 49. Id. at 23 (noting that despite a high standard of protection for GIs, the 
Lisbon Agreement was one of the models used for drafting the TRIPS provi-
sions).   
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III. PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS UNDER THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT 
A. GIs Continue to Be a Source of Controversy in TRIPS  
Negotiations 
The treaties signed under the WIPO incur similar difficulties: 
either the scope of protection remains undefined and effective 
protection depends upon the good will of each Member country, 
or the agreement requires a standard of uniformity that is sim-
ply non-existent. The three previously-mentioned agreements 
exemplify how difficult it has been to strike a balance on the 
appropriate level of GI protection which would find support by a 
broad consensus of the international community.  Nevertheless, 
these agreements set the stage for the more successful TRIPS 
Agreement.  The Uruguay Rounds of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)50 provided the opportunity to include 
GIs in an international agreement that would guarantee protec-
tion.  TRIPS is a monumental step forward in the area of GIs in 
that, with more than 147 signatories, it is the first widely-
accepted international treaty in which all signatories are bound 
to protect GIs through substantive provisions and to enforce its 
application according to minimum standards.51  It also provides 
for a strong dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO.52  
Additionally, TRIPS provides for periodic review53 and renego-
tiations aimed at increasing GI protection.54 
  
 50. GATT was first signed in 1947.  Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Stan-
dards and Accountability for the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing 
the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a New Balance Between 
Sovereignty and Multilaterialism, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 413, 414 (2001).  The 
agreement was designed to provide an international forum that encouraged 
free trade between member states by regulating and reducing tariffs on 
traded goods and by providing a common mechanism for resolving trade dis-
putes.  Id. at 418. 
 51. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1 (“Members shall give effect to the pro-
visions of this Agreement.  Members may, but shall not be obligated to, im-
plement in their domestic law more extensive protections than is required by 
this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provi-
sions of this Agreement.”). 
 52. Id. art. 64. 
 53. Id. art. 71. 
 54. Id. art. 23. 
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One of the features of the TRIPS Agreement at the time of its 
adoption was that not all categories of intellectual property 
rights regulated therein had the same degree of legal or doc-
trinal development nor the same degree of acceptance among 
countries.55  In the case of GIs, the appropriate legal treatment 
and level of protection continued to be fiercely debated between 
WTO Members.56  The debate over GI protection did not follow 
the usual North-South divide;57 instead, the dispute creates a 
dichotomy of states, with “emigrant” nations on one side and 
“immigrant” nations on the other.58  The “emigrant nations” – 
  
 55. As previously discussed, prior to the TRIPS Agreement some interna-
tional treaties, such as the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agreement, and the 
Lisbon Agreement, contained provisions on the protection of indications of 
source and appellations of origin.  Even though they contained strong provi-
sions for the protection of appellations of origin, their practical results were 
meager.  This is because the Paris Convention included only a general provi-
sion on this matter, and because the Madrid and Lisbon Agreements had lim-
ited membership.  See discussion, supra Parts II.A–C. 
 56. See Reinbothe & Howard, supra note 21, at 158; see also Leigh Ann 
Lindquist, Champagne or Champagne? An Examination of U.S. Failure to 
Comply with the Geographical Provisions of the TRIPs Agreement, 27 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L., 309, 311–12 (1999) (“The inclusion of these [protections of 
geographical indications of source] caused heated debates during the Uruguay 
GATT Rounds and continues to generate discussion.  The article that causes 
most debate is Article 23 which deals with the protection of [GIs] for wines 
and spirits.”).  
 57. Traditionally, developed and developing countries have tended to be in 
opposite groups in the GATT-WTO system.  With some limited exceptions, 
this trend of opposition in North-South politics continues today.  Developing 
countries have organized themselves into alliances such as the African Group 
and the Least-Developed Countries Group.  But, in other issues, the develop-
ing countries do not share common interests and may find themselves on op-
posite sides of a negotiation.  A number of different coalitions among different 
groups of developing countries have emerged for this reason.  The differences 
can be found in subjects of immense importance to developing countries, such 
as agriculture.  See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries. 
Some Issues Raised, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ 
dev4_e.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2004). 
 58. “Emigrant” countries include those in Europe, Africa and parts of Asia, 
whereas “immigrant” countries include the United States, Australia, and 
Latin American countries.  Especially for European countries, GIs have a long 
and proud tradition.  Since antiquity, their existence has served to distinguish 
products and to indicate source, serving a similar function to that of present-
day trademarks.  See Dr. A. Grigoriev, Opening Remarks, Symposium on the 
International Protection of Geographical Indications, Nov. 9–10, 1989, cited in 
M.G. Coerper, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the United States 
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the European Union, Switzerland and former Eastern bloc 
countries and a selection of developing nations – support exten-
sive GI protection, while countries like Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States ally with Latin American nations and 
other “immigrant” nations to oppose GI protection.59  
During negotiations, GI protection was a very sensitive issue.  
Only at the very end of the Uruguay Round was an agreement 
concerning GIs reached, and this was largely due to the parties’ 
ability to link GIs with the agricultural negotiations taking 
place at the time.  Although the issue of intellectual property 
was included in the Uruguay Round at the very beginning,60 
early proposals were initially tabled by negotiators.  In effect, 
the first texts presented during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions came to light almost a year after the Montreal Midterm 
Review of the negotiation process in 1988.61  
B. Protection Granted to Geographical Indications under  
Section 3 of the TRIPS Agreement 
According to the TRIPS Agreement, GIs are subject to the 
same general principles applicable to all categories of intellec-
  
of America, with Particular Reference to Certification Marks, 29 INDUS. PROP. 
232, n.1 (1990).  
 59. See Addor & Grazzioli, supra note 5, at 883 (affirming that the suitable 
protection of GIs has never been a conflict of interests between developed and 
developing countries, but between the countries of the old world and the new 
world); see also Reinbothe & Howard, supra note 21, at 158.   
 60. The United States and Japan submitted proposals to the Uruguay 
Round’s Preparatory Committee covering all intellectual property rights and 
their enforcement.  This led to long negotiations in an attempt to reconcile 
differing proposals, but they ultimately failed to reach consensus.  Ultimately, 
co-chairs Switzerland and Colombia tried to reconcile all the proposals sent to 
the Preparatory Committee.  The Swiss-Columbian majority text served as 
the basis for the Ministerial Conference and in its list of “subjects for negotia-
tions,” Ministers included the item “trade-related aspects of intellectual prop-
erty rights, including trade in counterfeit goods.”  DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 10–11 (2d ed. 2003).    
 61. The proposals were presented by the European Communities, the 
United States, Switzerland, Japan, and a group of developing countries con-
sisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Ni-
geria, Peru, Tanzania, and Uruguay.  See, e.g., WTO Negotiating Group on 
TRIPS, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, presented by the European Communities, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 
(Mar. 29, 1990) (Doc #90-0178), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. 
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tual property rights included in the Agreement, primarily the 
“minimum standards,”62 the “national treatment,”63 and the 
“most-favored-nation clause.”64  Apart from these, Section 3 of 
the TRIPS Agreement regulates the availability, scope, and use 
of these intangible assets.65  
The structure of Section 3 is quite simple and clear.  First, 
Article 22 provides general protection for all GIs.66  In this re-
spect, WTO Members should provide legal tools so that inter-
ested parties can prevent the designation or presentation of a 
good that indicates that the good originates in a geographical 
area other than the true place of origin.  They can also prevent 
  
 62. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1 (“Members shall give effect to the provi-
sions of this Agreement.  Members may, but shall not be obligated to imple-
ment in their domestic law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement.”). 
 63. See id. art. 3 (“Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other 
Members treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals 
with regard to the protection ….”).  See generally Gail E. Evans, The Principle 
of National Treatment and the International Protection of Industrial Property, 
18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.  149, 160 (1996).  
 64. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 4 (“With regard to the protection of intel-
lectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a 
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members….”).  See generally 
Wolfgang Fikentscher, TRIPS and the Most Favored Nation Clause, in 
CURRENT ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 137–45 (J. Straus ed., 1995). 
 65. Both the Paris Convention and the Lisbon Agreement had a clear in-
fluence on the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement in general, but particularly 
in the case of GIs.  Substantive provisions contained in Articles 1 to 12 and 19 
of the Paris Convention (1967) were “incorporated” in the TRIPS Agreement 
with respect to the minimum standards concerning: the availability, scope, 
and use of intellectual property; the enforcement of the intellectual property 
rights; and, the acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property rights 
and related inter partes procedures.  This has had at least three important 
consequences: (i) Members of the WTO are to comply with the substantive 
provisions of the Paris Convention, mainly Articles 1 through 12 and Article 
19, even if they were not signatories of that Convention; (ii) all WTO Members 
are bound by the same Act of the Paris Convention (Stockholm Act of 1967); 
and (iii) the provisions of the Paris Convention incorporated in the TRIPS 
Agreement became subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
 66. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.  Among the protections, Article 22.2 re-
quires Members to provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent 
the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that indi-
cates or suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area 
other than the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to 
the geographical origin.  Id. 
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any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within 
the meaning of Article 10bis of the Paris Convention.67  
Another important element of Article 22 is that inconsistent 
use of a GI which does not mislead the public as to its true ori-
gin should not be considered an infringement of TRIPS.68  Addi-
tionally, Article 22 mandates that Members should refuse or 
invalidate the registration of a trademark which contains or 
consists of a GI, but only if such use of the trademark would be 
misleading.69  Moreover, there is no obligation to protect GIs 
which are unprotected in their country of origin or have fallen 
into disuse in that country.70  Thus, protection abroad is de-
pendent on continuing domestic protection. 
In addition to the general protection contained in Article 22, 
Article 23 accords additional protection for wines and spirits.71  
This additional protection encompasses three main elements.  
First, it provides the legal means for interested parties to pre-
vent the use of GIs which erroneously identify wine and spirits 
not originating in the place indicated by the GI.72  Second, it 
mandates the refusal or invalidation of the registration of a 
trademark for wines or spirits which contains or consists of a GI 
at the request of an interested party.73  Third, it calls on Mem-
  
 67. See id.  Article 10bis of the Paris Convention was amended to prohibit 
indications that were “liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the manu-
facturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose, or the 
quantity of the goods.”  Paris Convention, supra note 14, art. 10bis.   
 68. Misleading the public consists of any “act or practice, in the course of 
industrial or commercial activities, that misleads, or is likely to mislead, the 
public with respect to an enterprise or its activities, in particular, the products 
or services offered by such enterprise, shall constitute an act of unfair compe-
tition.”  See WIPO, Model Provisions on Protection Against Unfair Competi-
tion, art. 4, Geneva, 1996.  Also, according to Article 22(b), whether the use of 
a GI constitutes an act of unfair competition is governed exclusively by Article 
10bis of the Paris Convention. 
 69. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22. 
 70. Id. art. 24.9. 
 71. Id. art. 23. 
 72. This is so even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the 
geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions 
such as “kind,” “type,” “style,” “imitation,” or the like. 
 73. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 23.2 (“The registration of a trademark for 
wines which contains or consists of a geographical indication identifying wines 
or for spirits which contains or consists of a geographical indication identify-
ing spirits shall be refused or invalidated, ex officio if a Member’s legislation 
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bers to negotiate for increased protections.74  These provisions 
give GIs for wines and spirits stronger protection than those 
provided in Article 22 for other products. 
Lastly, Section 3 of TRIPS establishes a series of exemptions 
to GI protection in an endeavor to accommodate past registra-
tion and use.75  The first of these exemptions provides that noth-
ing in Section 3 prevents a Member from continuing to use an-
other Member’s GI if it has used it continuously in the past with 
regard to the same goods or services.76  Article 24.5 provides the 
second exemption allowing for continued use of previously ac-
quired trademarks.77  The third exception refers to generic 
terms and allows a country not to protect a GI if the relevant 
indication is identical to common names of such goods or ser-
vices.78 
C. Negotiation and Review of TRIPS Section on Geographical 
Indications  
Proposals by the European Community (EC), the United 
States, and Switzerland were indispensable to framing eventual 
obligations concerning GIs.  For example, key elements like Ar-
ticle 23’s “additional protection” for wines and spirits and for a 
multilateral register for indications of wines and spirits were 
  
so permits or at the request of an interested party, with respect to such wines 
or spirits not having this origin.”). 
 74. Id. art. 24.1 (“Members agree to enter into negotiations aimed at in-
creasing the protection of individual [GIs] under Article 23.”).  It must be 
noted that this third protection actually lies in Article 24 and not in Article 
23, which deals exclusively with wines and spirits.  Some countries are of the 
opinion that this obligation applies to all geographical indications, and not 
only to those concerning wine and spirits.  This topic is explored in further 
detail, infra, Part V.B. 
 75. See id. art. 24.  
 76. Id. art. 24.4 (either, (a) for at least 10 years preceding April 15, 1994 
or, (b) in good faith preceding that date).  
 77. Id. art. 24.5.  Article 24.5 provides that when a trademark has been 
acquired or registered in good faith before the date of application of the 
Agreement to that Member or before the GI was protected in its country of 
origin, measures adopted to implement Section 3 shall not prejudice eligibility 
for or the validity of the registration of a trademark or the right to use a 
trademark on the basis that such trademark is identical with, or similar to, a 
geographical indication. 
 78. Id. art. 24.6.  Also, the right to use a personal name is not to be preju-
diced under Section 3 of the Agreement.  Id. 
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present in the EC Proposal.  The eventual framework reflects “a 
very sensitive compromise in an area that was one of the most 
difficult to negotiate.”79  WTO negotiators did not resolve all the 
issues that were on the table, but instead agreed to include 
within the TRIPS Agreement a “Built-In Agenda” for future 
negotiations that was designed to facilitate continued negotia-
tions toward international protection of this legal category.  
IV. NEGOTIATIONS FOR A MULTILATERAL SYSTEM OF 
REGISTRATION 
A. Terms of Reference in Article 23.4: Facilitate; Voluntariness; 
Registration and its Legal Effects; Wines and Spirits   
Under the TRIPS system, WTO Members must open negotia-
tions in the TRIPS Council to establish a multilateral notifica-
tion and registration system for GIs.80  The precise terms of this 
obligation are in Article 23.4, which states that “[i]n order to 
facilitate the protection of geographical indications for wines, 
negotiations shall be undertaken in the Council for TRIPS con-
cerning the establishment of a multilateral geographical system 
of notification and registration of geographical indications for 
wines eligible for protection in those Members participating in 
the system.”81  
  
 79. Matthijs C. Geuze, Protection of Geographical Indications Under the 
TRIPS Agreement and Related Work of the World Trade Organization, in 
SYMPOSIUM ON THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS IN THE 
WORLDWIDE CONTEXT, OCT. 24–25, 1997, 41 (1999) [hereinafter Symposium 
1997]. 
 80. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 68. 
 81. This article was introduced in TRIPS at the request of the European 
Community, although this Proposal contemplated coverage applicable to all 
GIs and not only to those of the wine sector.  WTO Negotiating Group on 
TRIPS, Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, presented by the European Community, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68, art. 
21(3) (Mar. 29, 1990) (Doc #90-0178), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (“In order to facilitate the protection of 
geographical indications including appellations of origin, the establishment of 
an international register for protected indications should be provided for.  In 
appropriate cases the use of documents certifying the right to use the relevant 
geographical indication should be provided for.”).  The Proposal was included 
in the text that the President of the Negotiations Group presented in July 
1990.  See WTO Negotiating Group on TRIPS, Status of Work in the Negotiat-
ing Group, Chairman’s Report to the GNG, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 
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1. Facilitate 
As the plain language of the provision suggests, the objective 
of the creation of a register is to facilitate GI protections, thus 
providing the necessary means to identify and make public, in a 
transparent way, those GIs that Members should already pro-
tect.  Identification is required because, when compared with 
other intellectual property rights, such as patents and trade-
marks, GIs are often difficult to recognize.82  TRIPS unques-
tionably constitutes a dramatic step forward in protecting wine 
and spirit GIs and, as such, the term “to facilitate” used in this 
provision must be understood to identify GIs that Members are 
already bound to protect, not via future multilateral registra-
tion but, rather, by present provisions of Part II, Section 3.  
Article 23.4, along with the general definition of GIs in Arti-
cle 22.1, implies that the register is only for GIs which fulfill 
criteria established in the TRIPS Agreement.  Specifically, the 
provision suggests that only those that identify a good as origi-
nating in the territory of a Member will be able to accede to the 
multilateral register.  
  
1990) (Doc #90-0444).  During the autumn of that year, some countries were 
in favor of the creation of this register in the Uruguay Round and they even 
presented, in an informal way, some proposals which contemplated, in a de-
tailed and systematic way, the creation of this register.  These Proposals were 
debated by the Negotiations Group.  However, other countries were committed 
solely to examining this question in the future.  This disagreement was re-
flected in the project presented by the President of the Negotiations Group to 
the Ministerial Meeting of Brussels in December, 1990.  See WTO Trade Ne-
gotiations Committee, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations – Part 1 – Revision, MTN.TNC/ 
W/35-1/Rev.1 (Dec. 3, 1990) (“In order to facilitate the protection of geographical 
indications, the Committee shall [examine the establishment of] a multilateral 
system of notification and registration of geographical indication eligible for pro-
tection in the PARTIES participating in the system.”).  Finally, the Negotia-
tions Group decided to establish a commitment of future works exclusively 
applicable to GIs of the wine sector, as reflected in the final text of Article 
23.4.  TRIPS, supra note 2, at art. 23.4. 
 82. See Conrad, supra note 30, at 12.  One of the many problems related to 
recognition involves defining boundaries.  As Conrad suggests, “one of the 
notorious problems involved in the protection of geographical names arises 
from the fact that in most cases they do not identify a single business source 
and therefore it is often difficult to establish the boundaries of the region that 
can legitimately claim use of the name.”  Id.  The other problem with GI iden-
tification involves genericness.  See id.  
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2. Voluntariness 
An ideal system would require all WTO Members to partici-
pate.  However, a literal reading of Article 23.4 only establishes 
a voluntary participatory system.83  This raises the issue of 
whether a system based on voluntary participation could bind 
WTO Members once a GI has been registered.  The logical an-
swer seems to be that a voluntary system could only bind par-
ticipating Members.  However, for reasons of transparency and 
efficiency it is preferable that all WTO Members be subjected to 
such registering, since a system whereby GIs are recognized 
and protected in some Member territories but not others surely 
creates legal and economic uncertainty, thus undermining the 
objective of the protection.  Indeed, Article 23.4 calls for the es-
tablishment of a multilateral system of notification and regis-
tration of GIs, and a multilateral system can only be understood 
as requiring all parties to the WTO Agreement to be bound to 
protect registered GIs.  Unlike plurilateral trade agreements, 
which bind only signatories, a multilateral system must be un-
derstood to include all WTO Members.84  Therefore, in the lexi-
con of the WTO, “plurilateral” must be understood as referring 
to a system in which participation is entirely voluntary, 
whereas “multilateral” is understood to bind all Members.85 
  
 83. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 23.4.  Indeed, this position is supported 
by its wording: “…eligible for protection in those Members participating in the 
system.”  Id. 
 84. The Agreement establishing the WTO expressly affirms that although 
the four Plurilateral Trade Agreements (Agreement on Trade in Civil Air-
craft; Agreement on Government Procurement; International Dairy Agree-
ment and the International Bovine Meat Agreement) are part of the WTO 
Agreement, they create neither obligations nor rights for Members that have 
not accepted them.  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), art II.3, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
 85. WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Minutes of Meeting, 
TN/IP/M/4 (Feb. 6, 2003) (Doc #03-0786), para. 21, available at http://docs 
online.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  The representative of the 
European Communities stated that “a multilateral system was a system that 
somehow should concern all Members.”  Id.  Where systems and treaties in 
other areas of the WTO did not concern all WTO Members, they were termed 
“plurilateral,” such as the Agreement on Government Procurement.  Id.  In his 
delegation's view, “that was not just a purely theoretical interpretation.”  In 
the same sense, the representative of Switzerland stated,  
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Certainly, the phrase “Members participating in the system” 
at the end of Article 23.4 seems to refer to voluntary participa-
tion.  But, in my opinion, this reference can be interpreted as 
meaning no more than those Members who chose to participate 
by registering their GIs in the system.  Under this interpreta-
tion, a participating Member would still be obligated to afford 
protection to GIs registered by other Members, even though it 
chooses not to register its own GIs.  Nonetheless, the protection 
of registered GIs must be obligatory for all by virtue not only of 
the mandate of Article 23.4, but also via the other provisions of 
Part II, Section 3, particularly Article 24.1.86  This provisional 
  
The meaning of the term “multilateral” could only be determined by 
comparing it with the term “plurilateral.”  In the WTO context, while 
“plurilateral” was understood to refer to a system in which participa-
tion was fully voluntary, for instance, the Agreement on Government 
Procurement, “multilateral systems” were instruments which bound 
all WTO Members.  
Id. para. 28.  
 86. From a general perspective, it must be recalled that the WTO Agree-
ment has eliminated the imbalances caused by the collateral agreements, also 
referred to as “Codes,” concluded after the Tokyo Round (1973–1979), which, 
in most cases, differentiated the norms and procedures for decision-making 
and dispute resolution and whose acceptance among the Contracting Parties 
was limited.  However, some free-rider countries, countries which have as-
sumed only the minimum level of obligations have tried to benefit from the 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause of Article I of GATT.  These countries 
demanded the advantages resulting from these Codes, which they themselves 
have ignored.  To avoid these imbalances, Article II.3 of the WTO Agreement 
states specifically that the MFN Clause is not applied to the four Plurilateral 
Agreements.  See LUIS NORBERTO GONZÁLEZ ALONSO, POLÍTICA COMERCIAL Y 
RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA, 159 (1998).  It must be observed, 
however, that nothing equal has been established in the section of the TRIPS 
Agreement relative to GI protection. Therefore, if we admitted that the multi-
lateral register of GIs only must bind participant countries, nothing in it 
would prevent the other WTO Members from demanding the application of 
the MFN Clause established specifically in TRIPS, Article 4.  Fikentscher, 
supra note 64, at 141.  In the case of particular collateral agreements con-
cluded within the framework of Section 3, Part II of TRIPS, the MFN Clause 
cannot apply because Article 24 urges the conclusion of bilateral or plurilat-
eral agreements, thus revoking, in these specific cases, the benefits of this 
fundamental principle of the WTO system.  However, from my point of view, 
this interpretation need not be accepted.  Consider that a preliminary version 
of the TRIPS Agreement specifically established the following exemption to 
the MFN Clause for bilateral or multilateral agreements about GI protection: 
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intersection results in a system of obligatory GI protection for 
all because it prohibits any country from refusing to negotiate 
to improve the protection of individual GIs.87  Thus, the notifica-
tion of a GI to the register is equivalent to a request to open 
negotiations.  
3. Registration and Its Legal Effects 
There remains the question of how “registration” in Article 
23.4 should be understood.88  One view is that registration re-
fers to a specific way of implementing TRIPS requirements that 
differs from the common law approach based on case law.89  
Registration in the field of intellectual property is normally un-
derstood as involving the grant of a title of protection with a 
genuine legal effect.90  Under a system where registration has 
  
PARTIES agree that the preceding paragraphs shall not prevent the 
conclusion pursuant to Article 19 of the Paris Convention (1967) of bi-
lateral or multilateral agreements concerning the rights under those 
paragraphs, with a view to increasing the protection for specific geo-
graphical or other indications, and further agree that any advantage, 
favor, privilege or immunity deriving from such agreements are ex-
empted from the obligations under point 7 of Part II of this agree-
ment. 
WTO Negotiating Group on TRIPS, Status of Work in the Negotiating Group, 
Chairman’s Report to the GNG, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 1990) (Doc 
#90-0444), para. 4.2.  However, this provision was not ultimately retained in 
the final wording of the Agreement, which leads to the conclusion that this 
principle would be applied totally to bilateral agreements relative to GIs pro-
tection. 
 87. TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 24.1 (“Members agree to enter into negotia-
tions aimed at increasing the protection of individual [GIs] under Article 
23….”). 
 88. See generally WTO, WTO News: 1998 News Items, TRIPS Council, 
Discussion Develops on Geographical Indication, Dec. 2, 1998, at http:// 
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news98_e/pu_e.htm (discussing proposal for 
registration system).   
 89. See generally WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from the Euro-
pean Communities and their Member States, Proposal for a Multilateral Reg-
ister of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of 
the TRIPS Agreement,  IP/C/W/107 (July 28, 1998) (Doc #98-2930), available 
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. 
 90. The creation of legal effects upon registration is perhaps best high-
lighted by the Madrid Agreement.  Under the system created by the Madrid 
Agreement, the effect of an international application is to require each of the 
designated contracting parties to protect the subject matter in accordance 
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no legal effect, the act of registration would not add value to 
that of notification and therefore would not comport with Arti-
cle 23.4.91  To give it such enhanced value, registration should 
follow a phase of examination which would give it greater le-
gitimacy.92  
As with other titles of intellectual property, registration must 
confer a presumption of legality.  The legal implications of this 
interpretation based upon Article 23.4 would be a presumption 
of eligibility for protection in the markets of all WTO Members 
for all GIs inscribed into the multilateral register.  Equally im-
portant, the registration system must provide a forum for dis-
pute resolution where Members can challenge the presumption 
of validity and its legal effects for those GIs which are alleged to 
lack the requirements mandated under TRIPS.  In effect, Arti-
cle 23.4 implies that the future system of notification and regis-
tration need not affect the TRIPS Agreement’s rights and obli-
gations.  Instead, the register functions to assist in facilitating 
the protections arising from the TRIPS Agreement by means of 
developing more transparent and efficient procedures.  In this 
sense, the register does not increase obligations nor diminish 
acquired rights.  
The alternative view focuses on the text of Article 1, which 
states, “Members shall be free to determine the appropriate 
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement 
within their own legal system and practice.”93  Thus, the regis-
  
with national or regional law, unless it has lodged a refusal to protect within a 
certain period.  The system provides for the grant of an international title of 
protection, which provides protection in each contracting party as if a national 
title had been granted in that jurisdiction.  However, the office of each desig-
nated contracting party can refuse to grant the protection.  In the case of re-
fusal, the holder of the international registration or deposit has the same 
remedies as if the trademark or industrial design had been deposited by him 
directly with the refusing office.  See Madrid Agreement Concerning the In-
ternational Registration of Marks, supra note 43. 
 91. WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Minutes of Meeting, (Aug. 26, 
2002) (Doc. #02-4570), para. 108 (arguing, from the Hungarian representa-
tive’s comments, that registration must carry with it legal effect), available  
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter  
Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting]. 
 92. Id. para. 110 (quoting the Switzerland representative, as arguing that 
the “provisions of an examination and a challenge procedure gave legitimacy 
to the listing in the multilateral register.”).   
 93. TRIPS, supra note 2, art 1. 
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tration system need not supplant national systems of GI protec-
tion.  In this sense, it continues to be the prerogative of Mem-
bers to choose the legal means that best responds to their inter-
ests.  
4. Wines and Spirits 
Article 23.4 next addresses GIs for wine exclusively.  How-
ever, the Ministerial Conference of Singapore of 1996 also in-
cluded in the scope of its application the provision of spirits, as 
evidenced by the Ministerial Declaration of the Report of Coun-
cil TRIPS of 1996, in which Section 34 affirmed the following:  
In regard to GIs ... the Council will initiate ... preliminary 
work on issues relevant to the negotiations specified in Article 
23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement ... Issues relevant to the notifica-
tion and registration system for spirits will be part of this pre-
liminary work. All of the above work would be conducted with-
out prejudice to the rights and obligations of Members under 
the TRIPS Agreement....94 
Ministers did not distinguish between wines and spirits de-
spite their competence to do so.  Against this background, spir-
its were included in the Council’s work; any other course of ac-
tion would have been contradictory to the Ministerial Confer-
ence decision.  Nevertheless, some Members continued to fight 
against this extension, alleging that the Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration only included “spirits” in the scope of preliminary 
work to be carried out under Article 23.4.95  For these Members, 
the pronouncement in Paragraph 18 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration to the TRIPS Council to "complet[e] the work 
started ... on the implementation of Article 23.4….”96 confirms 
the intention of the Minister that, with the exception of GIs for 
spirits, the multilateral system be established in accordance 
  
 94. WTO Council for TRIPS, Report (1996) of the Council for TRIPS, IP/C/8 
(Nov. 6, 1996) (Doc. # 96-4704), para. 34, available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter Report (1996) of the 
Council for TRIPS]. 
 95. Id. 
 96. WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Ministerial Declaration, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001) (Doc. #01-5859), available at http://docs 
online.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter Doha Ministe-
rial Declaration].  
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with the mandate provided in Article 23.4.97  Those Members 
believe that spirits should be included in the “preliminary 
work” of the Council, but that they did not fall within the scope 
of “negotiations” which were envisaged only for wines.98  As a 
result, those Members believe that references to spirits should 
be understood as relating to such work without the inference of 
negotiations.99  
The Doha Ministerial Conference attempted to clarify doubts 
about the coverage of the multilateral register.  In the Declara-
tion passed at the Conference, the Ministers affirmed the con-
venience of negotiating the establishment of a multilateral sys-
tem of notification and registration of GIs for wines and spir-
its.100  Nevertheless, WTO Members have different interpreta-
  
 97. Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, para. 18; WTO Coun-
cil for TRIPS, Communication from New Zealand, New Zealand’s System of 
Protection for Geographical Indications and the Multilateral Notification and 
Registration System for Geographical Indications Under Article 23.4 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/W/189 (June 22, 2000) (Doc #00-2534), n.1, available 
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. 
 98. To reflect the current limitation of the mandate established in Article 
23.4 of TRIPS to wines, these WTO Members affirm that the term “and spir-
its” should appear in brackets in all the Proposals.  See Minutes of June 28, 
2002 Meeting, supra note 91, para. 18.  However, the Chairperson, during the 
debates, said that Members have a very clear mandate to negotiate the estab-
lishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs for 
wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference.  He 
added that a Special Session is required to fulfill the mandate in its entirety 
and not to go beyond the mandate. Id. at paras. 20, 137; WTO Council for 
TRIPS, Special Session, Minutes of Meeting, TN/IP/M/5, para. 31 (Apr. 28, 
2003) (Doc. #03-2231), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search. 
asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter Minutes of Feb. 21, 2003 Meeting]. 
 99. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, Doc. IP/C/M/20 (Oct. 
15, 1998) (Doc. #98-3989), para. 48, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments from the New Zealand repre-
sentative) [hereinafter Minutes of September 17, 1998 Meeting]; WTO Council 
for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/22 (Apr. 9, 1999) (Doc. #99-1407), 
paras. 83, 85, 86 (comments from the New Zealand representative, Chile rep-
resentative, and Korea representative, respectively that coverage should not 
extend to spirits), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp? 
searchmode=simple; WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/21 
(Jan 22. 1999) (Doc. #99-0240), para. 82, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments from the Argentine represen-
tative stating that spirits fell outside the scope of negotiations). 
 100. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 96.  The Doha Ministerial 
Declaration notes that the TRIPS Council will handle this under the Declara-
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tions of this mandate.  Some Members argue that the Ministe-
rial Declarations, like those approved in Singapore or Doha, are 
mere political declarations that cannot extend, generalize, or 
modify what has been settled by an international treaty.101  
Others affirm that Ministerial Conferences can modify the lit-
eral sense of some provisions of such treaties102 because of the 
  
tion’s paragraph 12 (which deals with implementation issues). Paragraph 12 
offers two tracks:  
(a) where we provide a specific negotiating mandate in this Declara-
tion, the relevant implementation issues shall be addressed under 
that mandate; (b) the other outstanding implementation issues shall 
be addressed as a matter of priority by the relevant WTO bodies, 
which shall report to the Trade Negotiations Committee, established 
under paragraph 46 below, by the end of 2002 for appropriate action. 
Id. at para. 12. 
 101. In the final phase of negotiations of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
enough divergences arose among WTO Members as to whether this Declara-
tion could or could not establish new mandates of negotiation not strictly es-
tablished under the WTO Agreements.  The Communication presented by 
Argentina rejected any legal relevance to the Doha Declaration with respect to 
the extension of additional GI protection to products other than wines and 
spirits, when no specific disposition existed in the WTO Agreements.  WTO 
Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Communication from Argentina Re-
garding Paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Draft Ministerial Declaration, 
WT/MIN(01)/W/8 (Nov. 12, 2001) (Doc #01-5726), available at http://docs 
online.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  Alternatively, the Com-
munication presented two days later by Bulgaria, the European Community 
and their Member States, Slovenia, Hungary, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauri-
tius, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Czech Republic, the Slovakian Republic, Sri 
Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey emphasized these Members’ belief 
that paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration clearly estab-
lished a mandate to initiate negotiations on the extension of additional protec-
tion.  WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Communication from 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the European Communities and its Member 
States, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Kenya, Mauritius, Pakistan, the Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, and Turkey Regarding 
Paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Draft Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/W/11 
(Nov. 14, 2001) (Doc. #01-5796), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple; see also WTO Ministerial Conference, 
Fourth Session, Communication from Bulgaria, Kenya, India, and Sri Lanka 
Regarding Paragraphs 18 and 12 of the Draft Ministerial Declaration, 
WT/MIN(01)/W/9 (Nov. 13, 2001) (Doc. #01-5779), available at http://docs 
online.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  
 102. It is doubtful that the Doha Ministerial Declaration could be defined as 
an interpretation of the Ministerial Conference following the recommenda-
tions established in Article IX.2 of the WTO Agreement, since the parties did 
not show any evidence of consideration of this provision when drafting the 
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authority of interpretation attributed to the Ministerial Confer-
ence on Treaties signed in the Uruguay Round.103  
Thus far, the focus of the analysis has been on how the man-
date established in Article 23.4 of TRIPS should be interpreted.  
The next section advances the debate by outlining a few main 
proposals presented by the TRIPS Council about the notifica-
tion and registration system of GIs.    
B. Differing Proposals on the Nature of the Registration System 
The submissions that have been presented at the TRIPS 
Council for the establishment of a multilateral notification and 
registration system for GIs can be divided into two camps.  The 
first is a minimalist approach defended by the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, along with many Latin Ameri-
can countries.  These nations advocate a voluntary system 
  
Declaration.  Perhaps the best explanation is that the Declaration was 
adopted following Article III.2 of the WTO Agreement.  See generally J. Thuo 
Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
292 (2002); Daya Shanker, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 
Dispute Settlement System of the WTO and the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement, 36(4) J. WORLD TRADE 721, 722 (2002).  Some analysts have 
suggested that the Doha Declaration must be seen as an understanding simi-
lar to the six understandings of the GATT passed during the Uruguay Round.  
See Steve Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations, 207 J. OF 
INT’L ECON. L. 207, 211 (2002).  It must be observed that in the case United 
States - Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the Ap-
pellate Body noted the statements established in the Report of a WTO Council 
on Trade and Environment, which was part of a Report of the General Council 
for the Singapore Conference.  WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United 
States – Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (Doc. #98-3899), 38 I.L.M. 118, para. 168, 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  
Thus, if a Report of a WTO body can be useful to interpret the WTO law, it 
should be even more useful for a Decision of the Ministerial Conference. 
 103. WTO Agreement, supra note 84, art. IX.2.  In several cases, GATT 
Panels have emphasized the authority of the Ministerial Conference and the 
General Council.  See, e.g., WTO Report of the Appellate Body in the case 
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS/11/AB/R, sec. E (Oct. 4, 1996) (Doc. #96-3951), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple; Report of the 
Panel in the case European Economic Community Restriction on Imports of 
Apples from Chile, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) 93, para. 12.1 (July 1990) (de-
nominating the Ministerial Conference’s interpretation as “authentic 
interpretation of a treaty”). 
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characterized by its transparency.  It would create no legal 
rights, and consequently, the inscription of a GI would not re-
quire protection by other Members.  The second proposal advo-
cating a minimalist approach is presented by Hong Kong, 
China, in which the inscription of a GI into the register would 
lack a process of substantive examination or opposition at the 
multilateral level.  The inscription would be put into effect only 
after a cursory, formal examination of the GI subject to notifica-
tion and questions relating to the conformity of a GI with Arti-
cle 22.1.  The applicability of the exceptions would remain in 
the local jurisdiction in accordance with domestic law.  The ob-
ligation to give legal effect to registration under the system 
would only be binding on participating Members.  
The second group advocates a maximalist approach.  Mem-
bers of the European Union, Switzerland, former Eastern bloc 
countries, and a selection of developing countries champion this 
view.  The maximalist approach supports a compulsory system 
in which a GI would benefit from unconditional protection in 
the markets of all Members upon its inscription in the register.  
1. The Minimalist Approach  
i) The United States-led Proposal 
The primary proposal advocating a minimalist approach was 
presented by the United States, Canada, Chile and Japan (U.S.-
led Proposal).104  The system of notification and registration of 
  
 104. The first proposal presented by the United States and Japan was the 
Communication dated March 11, 1999.  WTO Council for TRIPS, Proposal for 
a Multilateral System for Notification and Registration of Geographic Indica-
tions for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
IP/C/W/133 (Mar. 11, 1999) (Doc. #99-0978), available at http:// 
docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter U.S.-led 
Proposal].  This proposal was later sponsored by Canada and Chile.  WTO 
Council for TRIPS, Proposal for a Multilateral System for Notification and 
Registration of Geographic Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 
23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/W/133/Rev.1 (July 26, 1999) (Doc. #99-
3125), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode 
=simple.  Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, and New Zealand also sup-
ported the U.S. initiative.  WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Multilat-
eral System of Notification of Geographical Indications for Wines (and Spirits), 
WTO Doc. TN/IP/W/6 (Oct. 29, 2002) (Doc. #02-5938), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  Also providing 
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GIs urged in this approach is characterized solely by its infor-
mative nature.  The system proposed would not create legal 
rights, and consequently, the inscription of a GI would not re-
quire protection by other Members.105  Under this proposal, reg-
istration follows receipt by the administering body of notifica-
tions from participating Members.  It includes notification in a 
searchable database of all GIs for wines and spirits and affirms 
the principle that GIs are territorial rights and, therefore, the 
conditions for granting and exercising them must be established 
in national legislations of WTO Members.106  For that reason, 
the minimalist approach conceives of a voluntary system of no-
tification and registration.107  This means that any GI for wines 
or spirits established in accordance with national legislation is 
entitled to protection under Part II, Section 3, of the TRIPS, 
regardless of whether it is registered in the WTO database.108 
Members wishing to participate in this system submit to the 
Secretariat a list of domestic GIs eligible for protection under 
their national legislation, indicating the date, if any, on which 
protection will expire.109  Subsequent notifications include addi-
tional domestic GIs eligible for protection under a Member's 
national legislation and any previously-notified GIs no longer 
eligible for such protection.110  Following receipt of notifications, 
  
support to the minimalist approach is Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, the Philippines, Guatemala, Honduras, Namibia, the Dominican Re-
public and Chinese Taipei.  WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Multi-
lateral System of Notification of Geographical Indications for Wines (and Spir-
its), WTO Doc. TN/IP/W/5 (Oct. 23, 2002) (Doc. #02-5799), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  The October 
29, 2002 Communication represents the most recent contribution from these 
countries to the debate on the establishment of a multilateral system of notifi-
cation and registry of GIs.   
 105. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104, art. 3.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. para. 4. 
 108. Id. para. 3. 
 109. Id. The lists shall provide, with respect to each indication, the WTO 
Member that notified the indication, the expiration date of protection, if any, 
and any other multilateral agreement for GIs under which the indication is 
protected. The database, in turn, would include: the GI for the wine or spirit 
that has been notified, the WTO Member which has made the notification, the 
date on which the indication is protected by the notifying Member, the expira-
tion date, if any, and any agreement under which the indication is protected. 
 110. Id. para. 2. 
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the Secretariat will compile a database of all notified GIs for 
wines and spirits and distribute copies to all Members.111  After 
the initial notification, the Secretariat will revise the database 
of notified GIs, adding or deleting indications in accordance 
with Members’ notifications.  Moreover, the proposal states 
that, in accordance with Article 23.3, identical or similar GIs 
may be submitted by more than one WTO Member, provided 
that the GI is recognized by each notifying WTO Member in 
accordance with its national regime for protecting GIs.   
With regard to the effects under national legislation, partici-
pants would be legally bound to consult the database, along 
with other sources of information, when making decisions re-
garding the recognition and protection of GIs for wines and 
spirits.112  Registration in the multilateral system would not 
give rise to any presumption regarding eligibility for protection 
given the territorial nature of GIs and the application of Article 
24 exceptions, which would remain in force under national law.  
Non-participants would be encouraged to refer to the database, 
along with other sources of information, in making such deci-
sions under their national legislation.113  Thus, Members’ par-
ticipation would be limited to receiving these lists, among other 
sources of information, when they must make decisions on the 
protection in their territories of GIs of other Members.114 
  
 111. Id. (“The Secretariat shall have no discretion to decline acceptance of a 
GI notified by a WTO Member.”). 
 112. See id.  
 113. Id.  The proposal asserts that  
[i]nformation obtained from WTO Multilateral Systems for Wines 
and Spirits would be taken into account in making those decisions in 
accordance with that national legislation. . . . WTO Members not par-
ticipating in the system will be encouraged to refer to the WTO Mul-
tilateral System for Wines and Spirits, along with other sources of in-
formation, in making decisions under their national legislation. . . . in 
order to ensure that such decisions are based on the most complete 
information available. 
Id. 
 114. This assertion appears to conform with U.S. law, in which the right of 
an interested party to challenge the use of a particular GI in the United 
States does not extend to the right to challenge the compliance by the United 
States with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.  See 19 U.S.C. § 
3512(c). 
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With regard to appeals or objections, the proposal sets out 
that decisions concerning protection for GIs, regardless of 
whether the WTO is notified, should occur at the national level 
at the request of interested parties.115  Should any appeal or ob-
jection result in a final decision that a domestic GI is ineligible 
for protection, that Member should notify the Secretariat dur-
ing the subsequent notification period.116 
ii) Hong Kong Proposal 
The second proposal advocating the minimalist approach was 
presented by Hong Kong.117  Although this proposal attempts to 
reconcile the minimalist approach of the U.S.-led Proposal with 
the maximalist approach of the European Community, it is not 
truly a middle-ground proposal.  Instead, it is much closer to 
the other minimalist proposals. 
The Hong Kong Proposal proffers a multilateral system that 
would involve only a cursory formal examination of the GI sub-
ject to notification.118  This would contain basic information 
  
 115. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104, para. 2.  
 116. Apart from the proposal relative to the multilateral register, the 
United States presented another proposal arguing that one acceptable means 
of protecting GIs would be protection through the trademark system.  See 
WTO Council for TRIPS, Suggested Method for Domestic Recognition of Geo-
graphical Indications for WTO Members to Produce a List of Nationally-
Protected Geographical Indications, IP/C/W/134 (Mar. 11, 1999) (Doc #99-
0979), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode 
=simple.  According to this proposal, using the trademark system to protect 
GIs would have the main advantage that no additional commitment of re-
sources would be required to protect GIs.  In other words, a government’s use 
of its existing trademark regime to protect GIs would involve only government 
resources already committed to the trademark system for applications, regis-
trations, oppositions, cancellations, adjudication, and enforcement.  However, 
in my opinion, while the trademark regime may be advantageous to the 
United States, it is not an ideal model for multilateral GI protection.   
 117. Although it does not have any substantive commercial interest in GIs, 
Hong Kong presented a proposal about the negotiating mandate under Article 
23.4.  See WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Multilateral System of 
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications Under Article 23.4 
of the TRIPS Agreement, TN/IP/W/8 (Apr. 23, 2003) (Doc #03-2166), available 
at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. [hereinafter 
Hong Kong Proposal].   
 118. Id. sec. III.4.i (“The multilateral system involves only a formality ex-
amination of the geographical indication subject to notification.  Provided that 
basic information identifying the geographical indication, its ownership, and 
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identifying the GI and its ownership and the basis on which it 
would be entered in the register.119 In terms of formal legal ef-
fects, registration on the multilateral register would constitute 
prima facie evidence of: (a) ownership; (b) that the indication 
was within the definition under Article 22.1; and (c) that it was 
protected in the country of origin.120  These three issues would 
be deemed valid unless evidence to the contrary was produced 
by an opposing party.121  If such a party adduced evidence to the 
contrary, then national tribunals would weigh all the evidence 
and decide whether the issues and questions were proved to the 
standard required by the proceedings.122  According to the Hong 
Kong Proposal, this rebuttable presumption would help the pre-
sumed owner of the GI discharge the legal burden of proof on 
the three issues in the course of domestic proceedings.123  Con-
sequently, according to the Hong Kong Proposal, this would fa-
cilitate GI protection through Members’ domestic legal sys-
tems.124  The proposed framework would not change substantive 
legal rights of either party to a proceeding.  For instance, ques-
tions relating to the conformity of a GI with Article 22.1 would 
remain in the local jurisdiction in accordance with domestic 
law.  Questions relating to the applicability of the exceptions 
under Article 22.4 would continue to be decided by Members’ 
domestic authorities.  Inscription in the multilateral register 
would not have any legal effect or create any presumption in 
relation to these issues, except as it related to Article 24.9.125  
  
the basis on which it is claimed to be protected in the country of origin is sub-
mitted to the responsible authority, the indication will be entered on the reg-
ister.”). 
 119. Id. annex A, para. B.1 (“The examination process does not involve sub-
stantive examination.”).  
 120. Id. annex A, para. D.2.   
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. sec.III.4.v.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. sec.III.4.iv.  
Registration should be accepted by participating Members’ domestic 
courts, tribunals or administrative bodies as prima facie evidence of: 
(a) ownership; (b) that the indication is within the definition of ‘geo-
graphical indications’ under Article 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement; 
and (c) that it is protected in the country of origin.  The intention is 
that the issues will be deemed to have been proved unless evidence to 
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The system would also not deal with competing claims for GIs, 
which would continue under national law.  However, the Hong 
Kong Proposal suffers greatly because the lack of a substantive 
examination or opposition at the multilateral level limits the 
legal effects of registration to the rights holder.   
With regard to participation, the Proposal establishes a vol-
untary system under which Members would be free to partici-
pate and make notifications of GIs protected in their territo-
ries.126  The obligation to give legal effect to registration under 
the system would only be binding on participating Members.127 
iii) Shortcomings of the Minimalist Approach 
The U.S.-led Proposal offers as its main objective a minimal-
ist, limited information system in which national GIs would be 
notified and incorporated automatically.128  However, the legal 
effects that, in principle, the inscription of a GI in the database 
would have are not specified, explicitly or implicitly.129  This 
  
the contrary is produced by the other party to the proceedings before 
domestic courts, tribunals or administrative bodies when dealing 
with matters related to geographical indications. In effect, a rebut-
table presumption is created in favor of owners of geographical indi-
cations in relation to the three relevant issues. 
Id. 
 126. Id. annex A, para. E. (“Participation in the system is voluntary which 
means that: 1. Members should be free to participate and notify GIs protected 
in their territories; 2. The obligation to give legal effect to registrations under 
the system will only be binding upon Members choosing to participate in the 
system.”). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Milo G. Coerper, Certification Marks as a Means of Protecting 
Geographical Indications, 1997-1998 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. L., ANN. REP., 
COMMITTEE 202, http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/97-98rep/202.html (support-
ing this proposal, Coerper states that the system should not be obligatory for 
all WTO Members, but it could be a system of merely informative nature).  See 
also Lynne Beresford, The Protection of Geographical Indications in the 
United States, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 48 (1999) (indicating that any registration system 
that finally is created would have to avoid the creation of additional obliga-
tions for WTO Members) [hereinafter Symposium 1999]. 
 129. In the Meeting of the TRIPS Council on April 21–22, 1999, the U.S. 
Representative stated, “[t]he fact that a particular geographical indication 
was registered would not automatically obligate a Member to protect that 
geographical indication if it were not entitled to such protection under that 
Member’s TRIPS-consistent national law.”  WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes 
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proposal does not provide for a system with a truly multilateral 
character.  It attempts to be no more than an information sys-
tem where national GIs may be notified and automatically 
listed on a database to be established in the future by the 
WTO.130  Therefore, it is difficult to understand the added value 
of the system envisioned in the U.S.-led Proposal.  Although the 
burden on the WTO would be limited under this proposal, the 
costs entailed would not be compensated by any benefits other 
than those already existing at the national level and under noti-
fications made on the basis of Article 63.2.131  
A multilateral register clearly implies multilateral protection, 
and this must be the key element in establishing such a regis-
ter.132  However, the U.S.-led Proposal is limited to creating a 
  
of Meeting, IP/C/M/23 (June 2, 1999) (Doc. #99-2220), para. 51, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  From this af-
firmation, it can be deduced that the database would add nothing new and, 
consequently, would clearly not be useful “to facilitate the protection of geo-
graphical indications” as Article 23.4 prescribes.  Id. 
 130. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from the European Com-
munities and their Member States, WTO IP/C/W/260 (May 30, 2001) (Doc. #01-
2709), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode 
=simple.  The Communication lists criticisms of the minimalist approach.  For 
example, it states, “[i]n a number of respects, [the U.S.-led Proposal] does not 
seem to constitute more than a mere database.  It is not clear to us how the 
facilitation of the protection of [GIs], as requested in Article 23.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, would be ensured by a system limited to a mere database.” Id. 
 131. Article 63.2 states: 
Members shall notify the laws and regulations referred to in para-
graph 1 to the Council for TRIPS in order to assist that Council in its 
review of the operation of this Agreement.  The Council shall attempt 
to minimize the burden on Members in carrying out this obligation 
and may decide to waive the obligation to notify such laws and regu-
lations directly to the Council if consultations with WIPO on the es-
tablishment of a common register containing these laws and regula-
tions are successful.  The Council shall also consider in this connec-
tion any action required regarding notifications pursuant to the obli-
gations under this Agreement stemming from the provisions of Arti-
cle 6ter of the Paris Convention (1967).  
Id. 
 132. See WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from the European Com-
munities and their Member States, WTO IP/C/W/260 (May 30, 2001) (Doc. #01-
2709), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode 
=simple.  The EC attacks the minimalist approach for failure to understand 
the scope of the terms “notification” and “registration.”  As used in the U.S.-
led Proposal, “notification implies only transparency of information in a vol-
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record rather than a true registration, as it only refers to legal 
effects under national legislation.133  The system does not pro-
vide for a mechanism to filter out names that should not be pro-
tected and, therefore, risks creating more confusion than clar-
ity.134  The proposal is silent on the need for elements of proof, 
for the assessment of eligibility, or for an opposition procedure 
— elements which are indispensable to a future multilateral 
register.135  It is impossible under this approach to ensure that 
terms that do not meet the provisions of Articles 22.1 or 24.9, or 
which fall under one of the exceptions provided for in Article 24, 
are denied eligibility. 
The U.S.-led Proposal also does not establish procedures to 
resolve possible litigation, an indispensable procedure for any 
future multilateral register.136  At the same time, the proposal 
leaves open the possibility for Members to end or interrupt their 
participation without legal ramifications.  The great uncer-
  
untary and administratively simple system, while the term registration im-
plies no legal effects.  Consequently, it would appear that the provisions on 
notification and registration are identical in the joint Proposal.”  Id. 
 133. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104, art. 3.  (“Any [GI] for wines or spirits 
established in accordance with national legislation is entitled to protection 
under Section 3 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement, whether or not it is regis-
tered in the WTO database.” (emphasis added)). 
 134. Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, para. 75. 
 135. The U.S.-led Proposal makes reference neither to national legislation 
providing for protection, nor to the date on which each GI first received pro-
tection. 
 136. Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand and the United 
States clarify that if an opposition system is to be established, the right to 
invoke the exceptions provided for in Article 24 would be undermined because 
they would have to be used through the system and would be subject to the 
successful result of the opposition procedure.  WTO Council for TRIPS, Special 
Session, Multilateral System of Notification of Geographical Indications for 
Wines (and Spirits), WTO Doc. TN/IP/W/6 (Oct. 29, 2002) (Doc. #02-5938), 
para. 22, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode 
=simple.  Nevertheless, from my point of view, the establishment of this oppo-
sition system would have the ability to systemize the application of these ex-
ceptions and in no case would they be undermined, as its application could 
continue to be demanded by WTO Members.  However, Article 24.1 demands 
the continuous obligation for all WTO Members to accept negotiations on the 
continuity of the application of these exceptions.  TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 
24.1 (“Members shall be willing to consider the continued applicability of 
these provisions to individual GIs whose use was the subject of such negotia-
tions.”). 
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tainty regarding the legal effects of the system may thus in-
crease litigation and, consequently, administrative costs.137  
As to the voluntary system upon which the U.S.-led Proposal 
insisted, it is unclear whether non-participating Members 
would be bound to give protection according to Article 23.138  If 
non-participating Members were not bound, the protections an-
nounced in Article 23.4 would be undermined.  The literal 
meaning of the U.S.-led Proposal is based on a political com-
mitment without legal force:139 authorities would be bound to 
refer to the register, yet the register gives rise to no national 
legal commitment.140  The U.S.-led Proposal also does not pro-
vide for any monitoring mechanism which requires national 
authorities to “refer” to the lists of GIs on the database.  As a 
result, these national authorities will not know whether to rely 
on the information included in the system when making a de-
termination on the protection of a GI.141 
For these reasons, it is difficult to understand how the man-
date to facilitate the protection of GIs established in Article 23.4 
would be fulfilled through this system.  This proposal would 
establish a mere juxtaposition of existing national protection 
systems in a database without legal effects.  As such, its value 
would be minimal.  Assuredly, Article 23.4 calls for more ambi-
tious action than this proposal offers.  The proposal concen-
trates on the first part of the job, namely the establishment of a 
notification system, while the register would simply compile 
  
 137. Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, para. 69. 
 138. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104, art 4 (“The proposed system is en-
tirely voluntary and would not impose undue burdens.”). 
 139. In the U.S.-led Proposal, the proponents of this system expressly estab-
lish that  
WTO Members not participating in the system will be encouraged to 
refer to the WTO Multilateral System for Wines and Spirits, along 
with other sources of information, in making decisions under their 
national legislation involving recognition or protection of GIs for 
wines and spirits in order to ensure that such decisions are based on 
the most complete information available…. 
Id. art. 3.  This Communication also clarifies that this system will not gener-
ate specific obligations for the Members that decide not to participate.  
 140. Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, paras. 69, 75. 
 141. Minutes of Feb. 21, 2003 Meeting, supra note 98, para. 66. 
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participating Members’ information.142  This does not satisfy the 
requirement of producing legal effects that registration inher-
ently entails in the context of intellectual property rights.143  A 
database which national authorities might or might not be re-
quired to refer to does not constitute a registration system in 
the intellectual property context.  The costs of establishing and 
operating such a system should not be measured in absolute 
terms but, rather, in relation to the benefit offered by the sys-
tem. If transparency alone is the only advantage offered by the 
proposed U.S.-led system, it might not be sufficient to justify its 
costs.  To “facilitate” the legal protection of GIs under Article 
23.4, a multilateral system should help administering bodies 
implement, and producers and consumers avail themselves of, 
legal protection.144  
The U.S.-led proposal wrongly emphasizes the convenience of 
using national systems of trademark protection for GIs.145  Tra-
ditionally, confusion has existed between certification marks 
and GIs, fundamentally because of their similarities.146  But, 
GIs and trademarks are inherently different intellectual prop-
  
 142. The EC Communication takes the view that the U.S.-led Proposal con-
flates “notification” and “registration” into one concept because registration 
carries with it no legal effects.  See WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication 
from the European Communities and their Member States, WTO IP/C/W/260 
(May 30, 2001) (Doc. #01-2709), available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (“It would appear that the provisions 
on notification and registration are identical in the [U.S.-led Proposal].”). 
 143. This can be deduced from other sections of TRIPS which employ the 
word “registration,” most notably in Part II, Section 2, on trademarks.  TRIPS, 
supra note 2, arts. 15, 18–19. 
 144. See Minutes of June 28, 2002 Meeting, supra note 91, paras. 68, 81. 
 145. U.S.-led Proposal, supra note 104 (“The proposed system does this by 
providing an uncomplicated and efficient system for notification and registra-
tion of the geographical indications for wines and spirits that we recognized in 
the national systems of individual WTO Members.”). 
 146. Burkhart Goebel, Geographical Indications and Trademarks – The 
Road from Doha, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 964, 982 (“Although GIs are recognized 
as a type of intellectual property pursuant to Art. 1 (2) of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, it is sometimes argued that GIs cannot be considered as another form of 
intellectual property right since protection to the individual using a GI is ef-
fectuated only as a reflex of protecting a certain regional collective goodwill.”).  
In my opinion, however, this interpretation is incompatible with the TRIPS 
Agreement, which clearly defines GIs as intellectual property rights and as 
private rights. 
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erty rights.147  Requirements applied to certification marks are 
much simpler than those applied to GIs.  Also, the procedures to 
protect certification trademarks are different from those used 
for the protection of GIs.  In addition, a trademark has a limited 
duration.  Although its registry is renewable, GIs have no expi-
ration date so long as they are protected in their country of ori-
gin.148  Finally, a trademark system does not protect GIs against 
  
 147. A conflict not definitively resolved is the relationship between Article 
16 of TRIPS (which grants the holder of a registered trademark the exclusive 
right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent from using in 
the course of trade signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to 
those with registered trademarks where such use would result in a likelihood 
of confusion) and the provisions of Part II, Section 3 of TRIPS about the con-
flict between GIs and trademarks (Articles 22.3, 23.2 and 24.5 of TRIPS, 
which establish that geographical trademarks that mislead the public can 
only coexist with GIs when they exist prior to the adoption of TRIPS, grant-
ing, consequently, a certain priority to the GIs in conflict).  Some authors de-
duce from Article 16 that this conflict must be resolved according to the prin-
ciple “First in Time, First in Right” to make compatible public and private 
interests promoted by both parties.  For these authors, GIs must be seen as a 
“sign” in the Article 16 sense, which would let the holder of a previously regis-
tered trademark prevent the use of a concrete GI if there exists a likelihood of 
confusion.  See Norma Dawson, Locating Geographical Indications  – Perspec-
tives From English Law, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 590, 599 (2000); Harte Baven-
damm, Geographical Indications and Trademarks: Harmony or Conflict?, in 
Symposium 1999, supra note 128, at 61; Clark W. Lackert, Geographical Indi-
cation: What Does the TRIPS Agreement Require?, 109 TRADEMARK WORLD 22, 
39 (1998); Florent Gevers, Topical Issues of the Protection of Geographical 
Indications, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 
IN THE WORLDWIDE CONTEXT 154–55 (1997); Vincent E. O’Brien, Appellations 
of Origin and Brands of Geographical Significance: A Conflict with Potentially 
Serious Commercial Implications, 23 INT’L WINE L. ASSOC. BULL. 34 (2000), 
available at http://www.aidv.org/bulletin/bull23_09-2000.htm; D. J. Ryan, The 
Protection of Geographical Indications, in ESTUDIOS SOBRE PROPIEDAD 
INDUSTRIAL HOMENAJE A M. CURREL 425 (2000); W. Taylor, The Overlap Be-
tween Trademarks and Geographical Indications, 5 INT’L WINE L. ASSOC. 
BULL. 18 (1999), available at http://www.aidv.org/bulletin/bull31_04-2003. 
htm.  In regard to the relationship between GIs and trademarks, the Interna-
tional Trademark Association (INTA) adopted a resolution in 1997 supporting 
the “First in Time, First in Right” principle.  INTA, Request for Action by the 
INTA Board of Directors, Protection of Geographical Indications and Trade-
marks, Sept. 24, 1997, at http://www.inta.org/policy/res_geoindtms.html (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2004).  However, from my point of view, Articles 2–24 of 
TRIPS are lex specialis which takes precedence over the general rule for the 
protection of trademarks set out in Article 16. 
 148. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 24.9 (“There shall be no obligation under 
this Agreement to protect geographical indications which are not or cease to 
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abusive use in translated form, in connection with modifiers 
such as “like,” “kind,” “style,” “type,” or “imitation,” or in con-
junction with the true origin of the producer.  Thus, although 
the system of certification marks may have certain advantages, 
in no case could it replace a specific system of protection of GIs, 
whose creation Article 23.4 demands.149 
The incompatibility of the U.S.-led proposed system with the 
obligations arising from TRIPS can hardly be overstated.  If the 
trademark system was capable of providing absolute protection 
to GIs, the question relative to such protection would have been 
resolved in the trademarks section of TRIPS.150  In TRIPS, the 
  
be protected in their country of origin, or which have fallen into disuse in that 
country.”). 
 149. Possibly, as Michael Maher has stated, GIs and trademarks might 
communicate different information to the consumer.  Maher, supra note 12, at 
1925 n.47. 
A consumer presumably understands that a product may be produced 
by any business in the region identified by the geographical indica-
tion.  The geographic term may describe not only the product’s geo-
graphic origin, but also might connote specific qualities, features, or 
characteristics associated with similar products from that location, 
regardless of the individual identity of their producer. 
Id.  
 150. The U.S.-led Proposal suggests that the protection system of GIs 
through the trademarks system is perfectly compatible with TRIPS, thus ful-
filling all the prescriptions of Part II, Section 3 of TRIPS, in addition to the 
principle of national treatment established in Art. 3.  See WTO Council for 
TRIPS, Suggested Method for Domestic Recognition of Geographical Indica-
tions for WTO Members to Produce a List of Nationally-Protected Geographical 
Indications, IP/C/W/134 (Mar. 11, 1999) (Doc #99-0979), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  This compati-
bility was reiterated by the United States in the Meeting of the TRIPS Coun-
cil held on April 21–22, 1999.  See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meet-
ing, IP/C/M/23 (June 2, 1999) (Doc. #99-2220), para. 51, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  In this meet-
ing, the U.S. Representative affirmed that the protection of GIs by means of 
certification marks is a system which is compatible with the TRIPS Agree-
ment and constitutes a way to fulfill the Section III obligations.  At the same 
time, however, the U.S. Representative admitted that it was not the only sys-
tem compatible with the Agreement.  See also, Eleanor Meltzer, Geographical 
Indications: Point of View of Governments, Address Before the Worldwide 
Symposium on Geographical Indications (July 9–11, 2003) (outlining the U.S. 
position that the trademark regime can protect GIs and the shortcomings of 
the EC approach), available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/2003/geo-ind/en/ 
program/index.htm. 
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specific nature of GI protection is embodied in the reference 
made in Article 22.1 to the quality and particular characteris-
tics of a product coming from a specific area.  A link with pro-
duction in a specific area is, however, alien to the trademark 
system.  The bond with production in a certain zone is not 
linked to the trademarks system established in Part II, Section 
2 of the Agreement.  For these reasons, giving priority to the 
trademark system would simply deny the specificity and the 
interests of having an ad hoc regime, such as that embodied in 
Part II, Section 3.  Also, it is necessary to keep in mind that 
trademark protection systems and examination requests rela-
tive to those trademarks differ among states.  The U.S.-led Pro-
posal would have the effect of transferring the faculty that cor-
responds with the origin country to decide on the existence of 
the GIs to the country where the registry request has appeared.  
Likewise, it is highly questionable whether the elements of 
the Hong Kong Proposal could achieve the purpose of the man-
dated multilateral system enunciated in Article 23.4.  Similar to 
the U.S.-led Proposal, this proposal envisions a voluntary ele-
ment because Members would be free to notify and register 
their GIs, but enforcement would vary substantially.151  Seem-
ingly the multilateral system would have legal effects for some 
Members, but it would really serve as a plurilateral instrument.  
With regard to the formal examination proposed by the Hong 
Kong plan, such a simple examination would not facilitate pro-
tection152 because of the significant risk that such a system 
would contain unreliable information.  
The Hong Kong Proposal also established a renewable ten-
year term of protection.153  This was inspired by the system of 
protection of trademarks.  Nothing in the future system should 
prejudice how Members implement their obligations under 
TRIPS, a point of the utmost importance to all delegations.  The 
Hong Kong Proposal fails to understand that, unlike the case of 
trademarks, TRIPS does not require GI renewal.  Rather, GI 
protection under TRIPS appears to be available for as long it 
  
 151. Hong Kong Proposal, supra note 117, annex A, para. E. 
 152. Id. annex A, para. B (“The examination process does not involve sub-
stantive examination.”). 
 153. Id. annex A, para. C.  
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was given in the country of origin.154  Undoubtedly, a renewal 
system would prove more difficult and costly.   
2. The Maximalist Approach  
i)  The EC Proposal 
The proposal advocating maximum protection and legal effect 
for the GI registration and notification system was presented by 
the EC and its Member States (EC Proposal).155  This proposal 
provides for a full registration system and combines elements 
from the Lisbon Agreement156 and EC Regulation 2081/92.157  
This proposal favors clarity and legal certainty on the protec-
tion of GIs by advocating for the creation of a system that has 
  
 154. There is no indication in Articles 22–24 that a GI is subject to a shorter 
period requiring renewal measures. 
 155. WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from the European Commu-
nities and Their Member States, Proposal for a Multilateral Register of Geo-
graphical Indications for Wines and Spirits Based on Article 23.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, IP/C/W/107 (July 28, 1998) (Doc. #98-2930), available at  
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  The original 
proposal was revised two years later.  WTO Council for TRIPS, Communica-
tion from the European Communities and Their Member States, Implementa-
tion of Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement Relating to the Establishment of a 
Multilateral System of Notification and Registration of Geographical Indica-
tions, IP/C/W/107/Rev.1 (June 22, 2000) (Doc. # 00-2521), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple [hereinafter EC 
Proposal]. 
 156. The Lisbon Agreement, supra note 4.  See David R. Downes, How Intel-
lectual Property Could Be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. 
J. ENVTL. L. 253, 273 (2000) (proposing the use of the Lisbon Agreement for 
the Protection of Appellations of Origin as a model for local, regional, and 
international registration systems). 
 157. Under the Regulation (EEC) N. 2081/92 the protected designation of 
origin (PDO) allows agricultural producers in Member States an exclusive 
right to the name of a particular foodstuff that is determined to be unique 
because the production, processing, or preparation takes place in a specific 
area using local expertise and resources.  The protected geographical indica-
tion (PGI) also gives an exclusive right to a name for foodstuffs, but unlike the 
PDO, it does not require unique characteristics associated with a specific geo-
graphical environment.  EEC N. 2081/92, supra note 37.  Instead, the PGI 
grants protection for products due to their reputation.  See also S. D. Gold-
berg, Who will Raise the White Flag? The Battle Between the United States 
and the European Union over the Protection of Geographical Indications, 22 
U.PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 141–44 (2001); CORTÉS MARTÍN, supra note 29, at 
325–451. 
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several stages.158  In the first stage, Members notify their do-
mestic GIs together with regional, bilateral, or multilateral 
agreements protecting such GIs and proof of compliance with 
the definition of GIs to the Secretariat.159  In the second stage, 
the Secretariat notifies all Members of the submission.160  The 
Members then have an eighteen-month period in which to ex-
amine the submission.161  During that period, each Member may 
challenge the registration of the GI on any of the following four 
  
 158. The European Commission asserts that GI protection provides com-
petitive benefits.  European Commission, Agricultural Directorate General VI, 
Agricultural Report 1998: Quality - Winning Markets and Reputation, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/publi/review98/p09_en.htm (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2004).  The Commission participates in publicity campaigns, declar-
ing the high quality of the products with a given designation, to raise aware-
ness of the GIs both within the EC as well as in other markets.  Not all com-
mentators, however, share such a sanguine view of geographic indications.  
See, e.g., Charles Lister, Protectionism and Integration: Designations of Origin 
for Foodstuffs in the European Community, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 639, 639–40 
(1992).  One perspective sees Regulation 2081/92 as a protectionist policy, 
disguised under the banner of food quality.  Such a policy actually contravenes 
the EC's overriding purpose of market integration.  Id.  For a similar criticism 
leveled against trademarks, see M.A. Cunningham, A Complementary Exis-
tence: An Economic Assessment of the Trademark and Competition Law Inter-
face in the European Community, 10 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 141, 150 (1995) 
("Perception advertising distorts competition by deflecting sales from lower-
priced substitutes of equal or greater quality by differentiating products in the 
eyes of a target audience solely on the basis of a perception."). 
 159. EC Proposal, supra note 155. 
Notification to the Secretariat shall be accompanied by … prima facie 
evidence of the geographical indication’s conformity with the provi-
sions of the Agreement….  Each participating Member may provide 
any other information it considers useful for the Agreement’s imple-
mentation and for national application of the Prohibition on the use 
of geographical indications for non-originating products. 
Id. (emphasis added).  As to the question of what kind of proof would be ap-
propriate, Members should not limit themselves as to what should be recog-
nized as acceptable proof, in order to take into account the different legal sys-
tems in WTO Members.  It could be the relevant legislation, but it could also 
be national certificates of registration, information on the original characteris-
tics of the product, statistics of production, national regulations on the quality 
applicable to the product and the existence of producers’ associations.  Cer-
tainly, elements of proof should fully support an application for registration, 
and when objections to a registration are being raised, they should fully sup-
port the objections. 
 160. Id. para. C. 
 161. Id.  
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grounds for opposition: non-compliance with the general defini-
tion of a GI;162 absence of protection in the country of origin,163 
genericness,164 and that the use of the GI would be misleading.165  
During the eighteen months following the publication by the 
Secretariat, the Members would be able to examine the GI’s 
legitimacy by requesting explanations from the Member who 
presented the registration request.  During this period, if a 
Member properly challenged the protection of a proposed GI, 
bilateral negotiations would be undertaken with the aim of 
reaching an agreement.166 
As far as who must demonstrate the grounds for opposition, 
the EC Proposal establishes that, in accordance with the TRIPS 
provisions and the normal legal practice in the WTO, the Mem-
ber invoking the benefit must demonstrate that it has fulfilled 
the necessary conditions.167  According to this principle, Mem-
bers must invoke the exception and prove its applicability if the 
Member trying to register the GI does not agree.168  
Once the period of eighteen months from publication ends, 
the GI would be inscribed in the register.169  If, during that time, 
there has been no opposition, the EC Proposal establishes that 
  
 162. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.1.  
 163. See id. art. 25.9. 
 164. See id. art. 24.6. 
 165. See id. art. 22.4. 
 166. EC Proposal, supra note 155, sec. C.2. 
 167. According to the TRIPS Agreement and the normal legal practice in the 
WTO, if a party wishes to invoke a benefit, it must demonstrate that it has 
fulfilled the necessary conditions.  This principle is solidly stated in WTO and 
GATT case law.  See, e.g., WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United States - 
Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) (Doc. #97-1773), 7-9, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple; WTO Report of 
the Panel, Canada - Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/R (May 5, 2000) 
(Doc. #00-1695), para. 6.10, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_ 
search.asp?searchmode=simple; WTO Report of the Panel, United States - 
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001) 
(Doc #01-3806), sec. 3, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp? 
searchmode=simple.  
 168. EC Proposal, supra note 155.  The proposal speaks of “justified opposi-
tion,” although nothing is said of who judges whether opposition is justified.  
Id. para. C.2.  From my point of view, TRIPS Council can play a decisive role 
in the development of this function, in association with the tasks entrusted to 
it in Articles 24.2 and 68. 
 169. Id. 
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no Member will be able to reject the protection alleging that it 
does not fulfill the conditions demanded in the general defini-
tion.170  Members also may not allege that the GI, although lit-
erally true as to the territory in which the goods originated, 
falsely represents that the goods originated in another terri-
tory.171  Moreover, Members may not allege that the GI deals 
with a generic term.172  It is possible, however, to deduce sensu 
contrario that the other exceptions to the protection will con-
tinue to allowed to be demanded by any Member.173 
From its inscription in the register, the GI would benefit from 
unconditional protection in the markets of all Members, as it 
would then be considered prima facie compatible with the defi-
nition in Article 22.1 and consequently deserving of protec-
tion.174  Nevertheless, such presumption could be refuted if use 
of a GI was the object of a controversy before a national tribu-
nal.175  The register would protect GIs of other Members, since 
national jurisdictions and trademarks offices would have con-
cise and clear information at their disposition.  The list of GIs 
that had been registered would be published so that all the op-
erators might know the inscription in the register.  Conse-
quently, the GIs would benefit from the presumption of protec-
tion.  In addition, the EC Proposal mandates that Members will 
have to establish legal means so that the interested parties use 
the registration as a presumption of GI protection. 
  
 170. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.1. 
 171. See id. art. 22.4. 
 172. See id. art. 24.6. 
 173. Although in accordance with Article 24.1 of TRIPS, this WTO Member 
must agree to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of 
individual GIs.  Furthermore, the provisions of paragraphs 4–8 of Article 24 
may not be used by the WTO Member to refuse to conduct negotiations or to 
conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements.  In the context of such negotia-
tions, Members shall be willing to consider the continued applicability of these 
provisions to individual GIs whose use was the subject of such negotiations.  
See Knaak, supra note 40, at 135. 
 174. EC Proposal, supra note 155. 
 175. Id. 
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Concerning the problem of homonymous GIs,176 the proposal 
establishes the principle of coexistence in order to avoid decep-
tive practices vis-à-vis the consumer.177  Negotiations could take 
place at that point between Members to avoid such fraud.  Fur-
ther, once any opposition procedure has been concluded, the GI 
would be registered by the Secretariat and thereby benefit from 
unconditional TRIPS-level protection.  Finally, the EC Proposal 
establishes that the registration system should take into ac-
count future developments, such as when a GI was no longer 
used or a new GI had come into being.178  
ii) Critical Appraisal: Why the EC Proposal Works Best  
The EC Proposal is the only one that facilitates multilateral 
GI protection as Article 23.4 prescribes.  The principal charac-
teristic of the EC Proposal is its concept of a full registration 
system.  Although voluntary, the system proposed by the EC 
would provide that once a GI was registered it would bind all 
WTO Members.  Rights to oppose registration would counter-
balance this legal obligation.  It, therefore, does not create new 
obligations, as any Member would have the opportunity to op-
pose a registration under the EC Proposal.179 
But, is a system which creates legal effects at the interna-
tional level really necessary to facilitate protection?  There are 
several reasons why it is necessary, but the most important is 
that international legal effects would make GI protection easier 
to implement by providing that registered GIs benefit from a 
presumption of eligibility for protection.180  The system would 
enable producers to reduce costs as they would have easier ac-
cess to the legal means available to them to secure and enforce 
  
 176. See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 23.3.  Homonymous geographical indica-
tions entail the use of two or more identical geographical indications used to 
designate the geographical origin of products stemming from different coun-
tries.  The most frequent cases of homonymous geographical indications con-
cern the names of regions which are located in different countries.  An exam-
ple for such a region would be an area situated along a river running through 
several countries, such as the Rhine. 
 177. EC Proposal, supra note 155, para. D. 
 178. Id. para. E.  
 179. Id. para. C.2. 
 180. Id. art. 11. 
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the level of protection prescribed in Articles 22 and 23.181  Pro-
ducers would not feel compelled to seek protection of their GIs 
by way of prevention in Member countries.  Occasional 
free-riding of a notified GI would be discouraged because pro-
ducers using GIs registered by other countries would have to 
bear the burden of proof and incur litigation costs. 
In case of litigation, the register would be a tool for these pro-
ducers to “facilitate” the protection of their GIs by shifting the 
burden of proof.  This could be particularly valuable for produc-
ers in developing countries who might not otherwise have the 
means to assert their rights in all markets.  The notification, 
examination, and opposition phases should therefore be consid-
ered an investment in the system’s viability; the costs involved 
would be offset by the benefit that would be derived from effec-
tive protection.182  Without a presumption of eligibility, in most 
cases it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the average 
right-holder of a GI to enforce his rights under Article 23, be-
cause he would have to build a case from scratch before local 
courts.  In certain cases, litigants would be thousands of kilo-
meters from home and under completely different legal sys-
tems.  This inconvenience would threaten the Members’ clear 
intention to provide Article 23-level protection to GIs for wines 
and spirits.  Under the EC Proposal, producers with a policy of 
international expansion would be able to save costs when de-
fending their names around the world. 
Public administrations would have timely information that 
allows them, for example, not to register trademarks containing 
such GIs, as prescribed by Article 23.2..  As a result, a system 
with legal effects at the international level is necessary to facili-
tate protection because usurpation would diminish and, in turn, 
litigation and administration costs would decrease.  Again, this 
  
 181. Id. 
 182. The representative of Switzerland stated in the TRIPS Council meeting 
held on November 28, 2002, that “[t]he notification, examination and opposi-
tion phases should therefore be considered as an investment for the useful-
ness and viability of the system; the costs involved would be off-set by the 
benefit derived from a real facilitated protection.”  WTO Council for TRIPS, 
Special Session, Minutes of Meeting, TN/IP/M/4 (Feb. 6, 2003) (Doc #03-0786), 
para. 94, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode 
=simple. 
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means that the EC Proposal would make GI protection easier to 
implement.  Under the proposal, registered GIs benefit from a 
presumption of eligibility for protection; moreover, piracy is dis-
couraged.  These two features benefit all parties: producers, 
consumers, and administrations.183 
Nevertheless, the EC Proposal is not free from criticism.  Cer-
tain aspects create difficulties.  In particular, the reach of the 
effects of decisions adopted within the opposition procedures are 
exclusively limited to the parties.184  This limitation of effects 
could easily lead to a situation where a notified GI which does 
not satisfy Article 22.1, or which constitutes a generic term op-
posed successfully by Members, would have to be protected by 
non-participating Members opposing the procedure.  This would 
lead to the incongruity of two different categories of GIs: those 
inscribed in the register to which all Members would have to 
give total protection, and those whose registration would have 
been rejected by some Members.  Those who had not objected 
would be forced to grant total protection.  It is clear that this 
would harm legitimate commercial interests in all markets, not 
only for Members who did not oppose within the term and, for 
that reason, are forced to protect the registered indication, but 
also Members who carried out the opposition successfully.185 
  
 183. But see, Goebel, supra note 146, at 986 n.72 (arguing that most of the 
existing multilateral systems of notification and registration, such as under 
Art. 6ter of the Paris Convention, the Hague Agreement in the field of indus-
trial designs and the Madrid Protocol in the field of trademarks, all rely ulti-
mately on determinations under domestic law to determine eligibility and 
protection).  See WTO Council for TRIPS, Special Session, Revised Note by the 
Secretariat, Discussion of the Establishment of a Multilateral System of Noti-
fication and Registration of Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits: 
Compilation of Issues and Points,  TN/IP/W/7Rev.1 (May 23, 2003) (Doc. #03-
2761), para. 57, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search 
mode=simple. 
 184. The EC Proposal states explicitly that “Members who have not chal-
lenged, within 18 months, the registration of an individual geographical indi-
cation under provision C.2 shall not refuse its protection on the basis of Arti-
cles 22.1, 22.4 and 24.6 of the TRIPS Agreement.”  EC Proposal, supra note 
155, para. D. 
 185. See Goldberg, supra note 157, at 117. 
This result seems to violate TRIPS in two ways: (1) if a Member can 
only oppose an application based on reasons stemming from the 
TRIPS Agreement, then a successful opposition means the geographi-
cal indication is not protectable under TRIPS; and (2) if only the op-
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Certainly, some exceptions provided in the TRIPS Agreement 
have a specific character depending on national markets.  Thus, 
the question of whether a GI has become a generic term under 
24.6 could surface in a national market, but not necessarily in 
others.  But, other reasons for successful opposition have a more 
general reach and, subsequently, must prevent the protection in 
all markets to obtain the true objective of Article 23.4.  Hence, 
when a proposed GI to the register does not fulfill the criteria of 
the general definition of Article 22.1, it must not be allowed to 
accede to the register at all in order to avoid undermining the 
credibility of the system. 
In order to avoid these problems, the system must differenti-
ate between absolute and relative reasons for opposition.186  The 
absolute opposition would be based on paragraphs 1 or 4 of Ar-
ticle 22.187  The relative reasons for opposition would consist of 
the exceptions to the protection established in paragraphs 4, 5 
or 6 of Article 24.188  GIs having been opposed with a favorable 
result on the basis of the relative reasons for opposition could be 
registered, and Members who did not participate in the opposi-
tion procedure will be unable to deny protection.  The refusal of 
the protection will be justified solely by the Member who has 
  
posing Member need not protect the geographical indication, then it 
seems that the MFN Clause under Article 4 would be violated. A way 
to solve this problem with the EC Proposal is: when a geographical 
indication is successfully opposed, it should not be registered at all. 
Id.  
 186. The system proposed by Hungary provides for a “multilateral possibil-
ity to challenge the registration of a notified geographical indication and that 
the results of a successful challenge, where appropriate, should apply on an 
erga omnes basis.”  WTO Council of TRIPS, Communication from Hungary, 
Incorporation of Elements Raised by Hungary in IP/C/W/234 Into the Pro-
posal by the European Communities and their Member States on the Estab-
lishment of a Multilateral System Notification and Registration of Geographi-
cal Indications, IP/C/W/255 (May 3, 2001) (Doc #01-2271), para. 2, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  
 187. The two grounds for absolute opposition involve failure to meet the 
definitional standards of Article 22, Paragraph 1.  The other absolute bar is 
Paragraph 4 which states, “[t]he protections under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall 
be applicable against a [GI] which, although literally true as to the territory, 
region, or locality in which the goods originate, falsely represent to the public 
that the goods originate in another territory.”  TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 22.4. 
 188. Article 24, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 involve previous use, use by a trade-
mark, and genericness within a Member State, respectively.  Id. art. 24. 
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opposed the register with a favorable result, and this informa-
tion must be entered into the register.189 
  
 189. Apart from these proposals presented by WTO Members, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are also trying to participate in these 
negotiations, as is shown by the paper presented by the INTA about the multi-
lateral system for the notification and registration of GIs, and by the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, regarding the expansion of additional protec-
tion for products other than wines and spirits.  The INTA submitted its Pro-
posal for the system in April 2003. International Trademark Association, Es-
tablishment of a Multilateral System of Notification and the Registration of the 
Geographical Indications for Wines and Spirits Pursuant to TRIPS Article 
23(4), Feb. 28, 2003, available at http://www.inta.org/downloads/tap_ 
GIpaper.pdf.  INTA recognizes that GIs need to be enforceable, without creat-
ing undue barriers to trade.  “INTA is convinced that it is possible to achieve a 
harmonious co-existence of protection systems for GIs and other intellectual 
property rights, including trademarks….” Conflicts between these rights 
should be resolved pursuant to the well-established intellectual property prin-
ciples of territoriality, exclusivity, and priority.  INTA believes that no means 
of intellectual property protection is superior or inferior to another.  INTA is 
of the opinion that the facilitation of the protection of GIs through the system 
should be based on the experience gained under other multilateral instru-
ments for the protection of intellectual property rights, in particular, the Pat-
ent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and the Madrid System.  From those two well-
established systems INTA extracts a number of features and conditions for 
the multinational protection of intellectual property rights: 
The international notification/registration should be based on the ex-
istence of a national application/registration; the notification should 
be facilitated through an international body; the examination of 
whether the intellectual property right at issue meets the protection 
requirements should be carried-out in the country where protection is 
sought; third parties shall be able to challenge the application and/or 
registration before the national offices and for national courts in the 
country where protection is sought.  
Id. at 3. Dealing with the substantive examination of GIs and with possible 
third-party rights through the established and largely well-trained national 
courts and administrative bodies will provide a particular advantage for 
smaller and medium-sized companies. For those companies, the costs for per-
suading a government to take up their case to the WTO will be prohibitive.  
Id. at 5.  The owner of a medium-sized company 
who owns a trademark registration conflicting with a GI in fifty coun-
tries would have to persuade the governments of fifty countries to 
raise an objection with the WTO in order to defend the exclusivity of 
his prior trademark.  The costs involved in such exercise will consid-
erably exceed the costs of filing opposition proceedings or a cancella-
tion action before… the respective national courts.  
Id.  “Furthermore, in many cases the trademark owner will not succeed in 
persuading a government to raise an objection on its behalf, since such an 
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V. EXPANSION OF THE SYSTEM:  ADDITIONAL PROTECTION FOR 
PRODUCTS OTHER THAN WINES AND SPIRITS 
The second battleground over GIs is the expansion of Article 
23 protection for products other than wines and spirits.190  In-
deed, a large group of WTO Members, especially developing 
countries,191 have proposed before the TRIPS Council the elimi-
nation of existing deficiencies in the sphere of GI protection 
with a view to applying the same level of protection of wines 
and spirits to all other products.192  As a result of the pressure 
  
objection may conflict with the specific government interests in the protection 
of its own GIs.  Id. at 6.  For that reason, INTA recommends that the system 
should follow a Madrid-like or PCT-like approach and include the following 
key-elements: notification/registration through an international body to the 
participating states, ex officio examination of protectability in the country of 
protection, refusal/opposition on the basis of prior (trademark) rights, ability 
to challenge the registration in the national courts.  Id.   
A system built on these concepts will facilitate - according to INTA 
document - the protection of GIs, in the same way that the Madrid 
System facilitates the protection of trademarks and the PCT facili-
tates the protection of patents. At the same time, it will recognize 
that GIs are what they are deemed to be under TRIPS, an intellectual 
property right, the importance and the value of which equals, but not 
surpasses, trademarks and patents.   
Id. 
 190. See Addor & Grazzioli, supra note 5, at 896 (affirming that, “the im-
proved protection of geographical indications for all products on a level similar 
to the one granted at present for wines and spirits, would promise trade and 
investments advantages, in particular for all these developing and developed 
countries which depend on exports of primary commodities”).   
 191. The issue of extension is of particular interest to developing countries 
because of the importance of the remunerative marketing of their agricul-
tural, handicraft and artisan production.  In addition, GIs have features that 
respond to the needs of indigenous and local communities and farmers.  See 
id. at 893–95. 
 192. The call for extension of additional protection for GIs to products other 
than wines and spirits was confirmed in the Communication from Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Cuba, Czech Republic, the European Community and their Member 
States, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauri-
tius, Pakistan, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thai-
land and Turkey, see WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from Bulgaria, 
Cuba, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the European Communities and Their 
Member States, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, 
Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sri 
Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, IP/C/W/353 (June 24, 2002) (Doc. 
#02-3484), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode 
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exerted by developing countries, this issue ranks very high on 
the negotiating agenda of the WTO.193 
A. The TRIPS Agreement’s Preferential Treatment of  
Wines and Spirits 
Presently, TRIPS provides two levels of protection for the 
same intellectual property right. Article 22’s base level of pro-
tection is limited to cases where the public is misled as to the 
true geographical origin of a product or where GI use consti-
tutes an act of unfair competition.  Article 23 enhances the level 
of protection for wine and spirit GIs beyond that provided for in 
Article 22.  The “misleading test” as applied to Article 22 is a 
burdensome requirement tailored to suit laws for protection 
against unfair competition or protection of consumers, but not 
protection of intellectual property.  In particular, the condition 
that existing protection only apply to the extent needed to pre-
vent “misleading the public” results in wide legal uncertainty.  
Unlike Article 23, Article 22 does not prevent the use of GIs in 
translation194 or if they are accompanied by expressions such as 
“style,” “type,” “kind,” or “imitation,” thus enabling free-riding 
on renowned GIs.  Nor does it prevent free-riding on the efforts 
and hard work employed to make a GI renowned.  All such free-
  
=simple [hereinafter Switzerland Proposal for Extension]; see also WTO 
Council for TRIPS, Proposal from Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela, IP/C/W/247/Rev.1 
(May 17, 2001) (Doc. #01-2491), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  
 193. See WTO Trade Negotiations Committee, Statement by the Chairman 
of the General Council, Doc. TN/C/1 (Feb. 4, 2002) (Doc #02-0530), at sec. 3, 
Agenda Item 2, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp? 
searchmode=simple.  The Chairman of the General Council of the Trade Ne-
gotiations Committee proposed that the Negotiations Committee should ad-
dress issues in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration 
relating to TRIPS in regular meetings of the TRIPS Council on a priority ba-
sis. 
 194. Goebel argues that one way of dealing with this issue is to try to define 
more adequately the scope of protection provided for under Article 23.  Goebel, 
supra note 146, at 989 (“Instead of providing general protection for ‘use in 
translation’ the scope of protection should properly be defined as use in trans-
lation, if that translation is associated by the relevant consumer groups with 
the geographical origin of the product.”). 
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riding should be prohibited to avoid the risk of GIs becoming 
generic terms.195 
Differential treatment of GIs under Article 23 can be ex-
plained as a product of negotiations of the Uruguay Round.  The 
relevant provisions are the result of trade-offs specific to cir-
cumstances prevailing at the time of the negotiations, particu-
larly during the Brussels Ministerial Conference in 1990.196  
This was, to some extent, due to the link at that time between 
negotiations on GIs and agriculture.197  Today, there are no eco-
nomic or systemic reasons for protecting some GIs and not oth-
ers.  As the sponsors of additional protection for products other 
than wines and spirits have stated, the risk of confusion be-
tween products which originate in a specific region and have 
special qualities, and products which use the same denomina-
tion, but do not have these qualities is damaging to any prod-
uct.198  
B. Advocating for Expansion of GI Protection to Other Products 
The economic and political significance of GIs grows as in-
creasing quality awareness and requirements increase demand 
for products of a specific geographical origin.199  The added value 
of exported goods increases chances for legitimate goods to 
reach the market, which is part of the global vision for a multi-
lateral trading system.200  Hence, since the end of the Uruguay 
Round, the awareness of the need for additional protection for 
products other than wines and spirits has continuously in-
  
 195. Switzerland Proposal for Extension, supra note 192, sec. III, para. B.  
Illegitimate use of a geographical indication with a “délocalisant” 
(i.e., so-called semi-generics) indicating the true origin or use in 
translation or with expression such as “kind,” “type,” “style,” “imita-
tion,” or the like, will be prevented for all geographical indications 
alike and will help therewith prevent more geographical indications 
from becoming generic, thereby gradually losing all economic value. 
Id.  
 196. For the importance of the Brussels Ministerial Conference of 1990 on 
the negotiating process and the final text of the TRIPS Agreement, see 
GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, supra note 
60, at 73–74. 
 197. See, Understanding the WTO: Developing Countries, supra note 57. 
 198. Switzerland Proposal for Extension, supra note 192. 
 199. Id. sec. II.  
 200. Id. 
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creased and spread among WTO Members.201 Extension of Arti-
cle 23-level protection would provide an adequate level of pro-
tection to GIs for all products, facilitating product identification 
by the consumer and, therefore, enhancing consumer choice.202  
Extension would open new market opportunities by preventing 
trade distortions.203  The benefits resulting from extension 
would foster the development of local rural communities and 
encourage a high-quality agricultural and industrial policy.  As 
is the case for products protected via trademarks, those benefit-
ing from adequate GI protection would be in a better position to 
benefit from enhanced access to third-world markets.  As such, 
a strong GI regime would bring economic benefits to producers 
worldwide, and not only to producers in countries where the 
local protection of GIs is already stronger than in the WTO. 
When considering extending GI protection, it is imperative to 
emphasize that the proposal presented by the sponsors of addi-
tional protection for products other than wines and spirits does 
not seek to require re-appropriation of terms and indications 
considered generic.204  The exceptions provisions of Article 24.6 
would continue to apply to such indications.205  The goal of the 
extension proposal is to prevent GIs, which are not generic, 
from becoming generic.  The proposal presented by these WTO 
Members also concerns other disadvantages resulting from the 
insufficient protection provided by Article 22, such as the bur-
den of proof required under that provision to defend a GI 
against misuse.206 
The creation of comprehensive GI protection is not incom-
patible with the smooth future development of business activi-
ties in a country.  The same problem has been satisfactorily ad-
dressed in the context of wines and spirits, as TRIPS already 
provides enough flexibility, such as exceptions and transitional 
periods ensuring that disruption of trade does not occur.207  
Transitional periods and exceptions can accommodate the in-
  
 201. Id. 
 202. Maher, supra note 12, at 1881 (noting that GIs are important tools for 
consumer protection and product differentiation in the wine industry). 
 203. Switzerland Proposal for Extension, supra note 192. 
 204. Id. sec. III, para. F. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. sec. III, para. E. 
 207. Id. sec. II.4.  See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 24.4. 
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terests of producers and make re-labeling unnecessary.  There-
fore, extension, as such, will not affect the production and ex-
port of products.  
In summary, the rationale of extension is that GIs for all 
products deserve the same level of protection as that which ap-
plies currently only to wines and spirits.  In order to establish 
such uniform protection for all products and broaden Article 
23.1 protections to other products, some WTO Members have 
proposed removing the reference in Article 23.1 to wines and 
spirits, and preventing the use of a GI “identifying products of 
the same category” not originating in the place referred to by 
it.208  This would eradicate the existing imbalance in Part II, 
Section 3, thus providing the same level of effective protection 
to GIs for all products.209  
However, many countries, including Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United 
States, have strongly opposed extension, partly because they 
believe there is no evidence that protection currently available 
for products other than wines and spirits is inadequate.210  They 
also object because they feel that extending protections would 
create unnecessary obligations, be significantly costly, and gen-
erate limited benefits, if any.211  Additionally, New Zealand, for 
example, believes that an extension to the scope of goods cov-
ered by Article 23 would be premature.212  The majority of these 
countries has been consistently obstinate about giving strong 
protection to GIs.  While these countries wish to approach nego-
tiations over protection for GIs and expansion of TRIPS slowly, 
Members that could benefit the most are ready to move full 
speed ahead.  
  
 208. Switzerland Proposal for Extension, supra note 192, art. III.B.12. 
 209. Id. sec. II. 
 210. See Woranuj Maneerungsee, Protection for Silk and Rice Hits Snags, 
BANGKOK POST, Nov. 21, 2002, at 3 (noting U.S. opposition to an extension of 
geographical identification protection).  
 211. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 150, para. 19.  
 212. WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from New Zealand, Geo-
graphical Indications and the Article 24.2 Review, IP/C/W/205 (Sept. 18, 2000) 
(Doc #00-3673), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search 
mode=simple. 
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VI. FUTURE PROSPECTS IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 
The main proposals presented thus far aimed at ensuring ef-
fective protection for GIs can be categorized as incompatible, 
thus, the negotiations on these proposals in the TRIPS Council 
have been stalled.  The views of the different Members are di-
vided, not only by the legal effects of the registration system for 
GIs, but also by the question of the extension of GIs to products 
other than wines and spirits.213  
With respect to the notification and registration system for 
GIs, the maximalist approach — represented by the EC Pro-
posal — seems best suited to achieve the objective of facilitating 
the protection of GIs as prescribed in Article 23.4.  Neverthe-
less, some countries have shown their opposition to the pro-
posal, alleging that this would demand the creation of an ex-
ceedingly complex and legally ambitious system.214  By contrast, 
those in favor of the U.S.-led Proposal state that the European 
system would establish new legal obligations for WTO Mem-
bers215 since they could be bound to verify hundreds of different 
  
 213. As a general matter, it has been argued that developing countries may 
find it in their interest to use GIs as a tool to help create and maintain both 
domestic and export markets for distinctive goods originating in their terri-
tory.  See Ralph S. Brown, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Protection of France's 
Wine Classification System Beyond Its Borders, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 471 (1994). 
 214. Minutes of September 17, 1998 Meeting, supra note 99, at para. 48 
(comments from the New Zealand representative). 
 215. While the European Community is proposing the creation of a register 
for all foodstuffs, other nations are challenging the very blueprint for this 
register.  At the conclusion of the 1999 Special 301 Review, the United States 
initiated a WTO dispute-settlement case against the EC based on TRIPS defi-
ciencies in EEC Regulation 2081/92. See WTO, Request for Consultations by 
the United States, European Communities – Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 
WT/DS174/1 (June 7, 1999) (Doc. #99-2282), available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  The United States argues that EEC 
Regulation 2081/92’s reciprocity requirement violates the National Treatment 
Principle of Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement and does not provide sufficient 
protection to pre-existing trademarks that are similar or identical to a GI and 
appears to be inconsistent with the European Communities’ obligations under 
TRIPS.  The United States argues that the WTO rules require the EC to af-
ford the same GI protection to non-EC states that it offers its own nationals - 
regardless of whether the non-EC nation has similar GI standards.  This could 
mean that this Regulation does not provide the same treatment to other na-
tionals and products originating outside the EC that it provides to the EC's 
own nationals and products; does not accord immediately and unconditionally 
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GIs and face onerous opposition procedures, which will be espe-
cially burdensome for Members with limited resources.216  More-
  
to the nationals and products of each WTO Member any advantage, favor, 
privilege or immunity granted to the nationals and products of other WTO 
Members; diminishes the legal protection for trademarks (including to prevent 
the use of an identical or similar sign that is likely to); does not provide legal 
means for interested parties to prevent the misleading use of a GI; does not 
define a GI in a manner that is consistent with the definition provided in the 
TRIPS; is not sufficiently transparent; and does not provide adequate en-
forcement procedures.  Invoking the first step to resolving a trade dispute at 
the WTO, the United States requested private consultations with the EC be-
fore deciding whether to initiate formal dispute settlement proceedings.  See 
WTO Request for Consultations by the United States, Addendum, European 
Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/1/Add.1 (Apr. 10, 2003) 
(Doc. #03-1960), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search 
mode=simple.  However, these consultations failed to resolve the dispute.  The 
U.S.-amended complaint alleged that the EC regulation also violated the MFN 
Clause of TRIPS.  Fifteen WTO Members have joined the consultations: Aus-
tralia, Mexico, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, India, Argentina, Hungary, Malta, 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovenia, Turkey, Romania and the 
Slovak Republic.  See, e.g.,  WTO, Communication from Australia,  European 
Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, Request to Join Consultations,  
WT/DS174/4 (Apr. 23, 2003) (Doc #03-2161), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  Finally, the 
United. States asked the Dispute Settlement Body to establish a panel.  WTO, 
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European 
Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/20 (Aug. 19, 2003) (Doc. #03-
4330), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode= 
simple.  Many other Members also requested to join these consultations.  See, 
e.g.  WTO, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the Australia, Euro-
pean Communities – Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications 
for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS290/18 (Aug. 19, 2003) (Doc. 
#03-4315), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search 
mode=simple).  In addition to these concerns, the United States raises objec-
tions to wine import certification practices instituted by the EC, as well as 
labeling requirements specifically relating to an EC attempt to phase out the 
usage of semi-generic names (i.e., Burgundy, Champagne, Chablis) on non-EC 
wines and other “traditional expressions” (primarily geographical indications) 
used to describe wine. See generally USTR National Trade Estimate Report on 
Foreign Trade Barriers, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/ 
Reports_Publications/2004/2004_National_Trade_Estimate/2004_NTE_Report 
/Section_Index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); ROBERT M. MACLEAN & 
BETTINA VOLPI, EU TRADE BARRIER REGULATION: TACKLING UNFAIR FOREIGN 
TRADE PRACTICES (2000). 
 216. Minutes of September 17, 1998 Meeting, supra note 99, para. 41.   
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over, the creation of a system with these characteristics would 
consume a great amount of resources. 217  These countries oppos-
ing the maximalist approach have also insisted that such an 
approach is incompatible with means used by many WTO 
Members to protect GIs, such as certification marks, unfair 
competition law, and common law.  
Whether the system should be expanded to establish addi-
tional protection for products other than wines and spirits is 
also hotly contested.  A large group of Members, predominantly 
from developing countries,218 supports expansion because the 
legal system currently provided under TRIPS, including its ex-
ceptions, is insufficient for providing strong protection for GIs.  
These Members believe that additional protection granted for 
some GIs constitutes arbitrary discrimination against all other 
products.  Conversely, there is another group of countries which 
believes that additional protection granted only for certain 
products in the TRIPS Agreement reflects the balance reached 
in multilateral trade negotiations, and should not, thus, be al-
tered at this stage.219   
  
 217. Id.; see also id. para. 45 (declarations of the Australian representative).  
Likewise, in the meeting held on March 21, 2000, the Australian representa-
tive affirmed that it had not been considered necessary under the TRIPS 
Agreement to override or preempt national decision-making processes on 
trademark or patent protection to create default global protection for individ-
ual intellectual property rights, even for well-known marks which were 
viewed by some as having global reach.  GIs should not become default global 
rights without reference to the specific commercial conditions and legal situa-
tions in the jurisdiction of each Member concerned.  WTO, Council for TRIPS, 
Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/26 (May 24, 2000) (Doc. #00-2113), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. 
 218. The call for extension of additional protection for GIs to products other 
than wines and spirits is being demanded by the following developing coun-
tries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Cuba, Czech Republic, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey. 
 219. Opponents, such as the United States, Canada, Argentina, El Salvador, 
and the Philippines, say that while an international register protecting all 
foodstuffs may sound appealing, it raises many potential problems.  First, 
they argue that an international register is not necessary because Article 22 
already provides sufficient protection for all foodstuffs and many countries 
have simply not resorted to using Article 22 TRIPS in protecting their prod-
ucts.  Second, while the EC and other advocates claim that an international 
register would benefit all WTO Members (especially developing countries), 
opponents counter that developing countries have few domestic GIs and 
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To date,220 the qualities that best describe the negotiations are 
a lack of dynamism and an unwillingness of some Members to 
advance questions established in the Built-In Agenda.221  This 
  
would, instead, find themselves having to provide extensive legal protection 
for a large number of foreign GIs.  Furthermore, opponents argue that the EC 
Proposal will not offer protection to nearly as many products as it has stated 
because many of these product names have become generic terms (which do 
not receive GI protection under the TRIPS).  Third, opponents claim that a 
global register would impose major costs on producers and consumers.  An 
international register, they say, will force companies to analyze every export 
market to ensure that their product names are not illegally using a GI pro-
tected under that registry.  A business using such a GI could be forced to re-
name and re-package its goods, the costs of which might be passed along to 
consumers in the form of higher prices.  Finally, they point out that the EC 
has had numerous problems with its own domestic GI regulation, and suggest 
that the WTO first create an international register for wines, evaluate its 
effectiveness, and then discuss the possibility of creating an international 
register for all other foodstuffs. 
 220. The Cancun Ministerial Conference ended on September 14, 2003 with 
no results, after the Chairperson Luis Ernesto Derbez concluded that, despite 
considerable movement in consultations, Members remained entrenched, par-
ticularly on the “Singapore” issues.  See WTO Ministerial Conference, Fifth 
Session, Ministerial Statement, WT/MIN(03)/20 (Sept. 23, 2003) (Doc. #03-
5034), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode 
=simple.  About the failure of the recent trade talks in Cancun, see Jeffrey 
Schott, Unlocking the Benefits of World Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2003, 
at 65.  Notwithstanding this setback, the Ministers reaffirmed all Doha Decla-
rations and Decisions and recommitted themselves to working to implement 
them fully and faithfully.  See id.; J.M. Paugam, Après Cancun: La double 
crise de l’OMC, 477 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 
230–34 (2004).  
 221. The Council for TRIPS met on April 7, 2004, for its first special (nego-
tiating) session since the Cancun Ministerial Conference, to continue negotia-
tions on a multilateral register for GIs for wines and spirits.  Discussions fo-
cused on the key outstanding issues in the negotiating mandate provided in 
the TRIPS Agreement, with fundamental divisions remaining among Mem-
bers.  Discussions at the meeting broadly fell under the two key outstanding 
issues related to “participation” and “legal effect.”  The meeting made virtu-
ally no headway, with one observer noting that in contrast to other negotiat-
ing areas, such as agriculture, the TRIPS discussions had not even entered 
the "listening" phase.  TRIPS Council Scrutinises GI Negotiating Mandate, 8 
BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST 6 (2004), available at http:// 
www.ictsd.com/weekly/04-04-22/BRIDGESWeekly8-14.pdf (last visited Oct. 
20, 2004).  The supporters of the joint proposal believe that the European 
approach, which would allow Members to challenge proposed registrations 
and would require registered terms to be protected in all WTO Member coun-
tries, would amount to “TRIPS-plus” by increasing the obligations under the 
TRIPS.  In response, the new grouping called the “Friends of Geographical 
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paralysis is made more evident when these negotiations are 
compared with those of the Uruguay Round, during which there 
was considerable pressure.222  Currently, no pressure exists, nor 
are there the commitments to negotiate that existed during the 
Uruguay Round where certain chapters of the final agreement 
could be combined with others.223  
  
Indications,” which included more than 50 Members, noted that such a data-
base would be unreliable – and consequently not “facilitate” protection – if 
Members were unable to challenge a term internationally.  They believe that 
allowing Members to opt out of the system would make it “plurilateral” rather 
than “multilateral,” as required by the mandate.  Rather than increasing obli-
gations, they stated that the system would simply facilitate Members’ compli-
ance with existing obligations under the Agreement.  Hungary also pointed 
out that, in any case, even the “joint proposal’ could be regarded as "TRIPS-
plus" as it would require a notification that does not currently exits. See id. 
 222. Coerper has stated that “There is no time schedule for such “negotia-
tions,” nor does it appear that any establishment of such a system need be 
mandatory – it could be merely informative – as regards to the wine appella-
tions notified and registered by the various members.  See Milo G. Coerper, 
Certification Marks as a Means of Protecting Wine Appellations in the United 
States, IPL NEWSLETTER (A.B.A. Sec. Intell. Prop. L.), Spring 1998, at 24. 
 223. Sergio Escudero, TRIPs: el alcance de la protección de las indicaciones 
geográficas, in TEMAS DE DERECHO INDUSTRIAL Y DE LA COMPETENCIA: 
PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL EN EL GATT 163 (Carlos Correa ed., 1997) (highlight-
ing that for some countries, the United States, among others, it is inopportune 
to conduct the negotiation now. For this author, nothing guarantees the regis-
ter will be created because there is not a specified period to achieve this goal.).  
See also Coerper, Certification Marks as a Means of Protecting Wine Appella-
tions in the United States, supra note 222, at 25 (emphasizing the absence of 
any precise timetable to carry out the negotiations as the main problem the 
creation of the multilateral register).  Nevertheless, it can be clearly deduced 
that Article 24.1 TRIPS is a commitment for Members to enter into negotia-
tions to increase the protection of certain GIs.  This pactum de negociando 
seems, in any case, to include the duty for any WTO Member to negotiate in 
good faith and avoid illegal delays.  See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(FRG v. Den.; FRG v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 46 (Feb. 20) (“The parties to a ne-
gotiation] are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotia-
tions are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists 
upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it.”).  An-
other scholar states: 
The idea that states are under an obligation to negotiate, at least in 
those situations where the extent of their rights can only be defined 
by reference to the rights of other states, is both the pragmatic and 
logical consequence of the interdependence of states in the modern 
world and of the general recognition, by states, practitioners, and 
students, of international relations of that interdependence. 
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Nevertheless, the future is certainly not discouraging. In fact, 
the apparent paralysis that has surrounded the debate in the 
TRIPS Council could change in the short run.  To begin, the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration placed the protection of GIs on 
the agenda224 of WTO trade negotiations,225 fixing a precise 
schedule of negotiation that impels creation of the registration 
system for GIs and expansion of protection for products other 
than wine and spirits.226  This mandate provides a definitive 
impetus to the negotiations that, up to the present day, have 
been suspended by Members reluctant to accord protection to 
this legal category.  According to the Declaration, the negotia-
tions must conclude no later than January 1, 2005,227 and will 
be supervised by a Trade Negotiations Committee which will 
act under the authority of the General Council.228  Furthermore, 
these statements have been reaffirmed by the General Council 
of the WTO in the Decision about the Doha Work Programme 
adopted on August 1, 2004.229 
  
Martin A. Rogoff, The Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules and 
Realities, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141, 183 (1994).  
 224. See Abbott, supra note 23. 
 225. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 96. 
 226. Id. para. 18. 
With a view to completing the work started in the Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights … on the implemen-
tation of Article 23.4, we agree to negotiate the establishment of a 
multilateral system of notification and registration of geographical 
indications for wines and spirits by the Fifth Session of the Ministe-
rial Conference.  We note that issues related to the extension of the 
protection of GIs provided for in Article 23 to products other than 
wines and spirits will be addressed in the Council for TRIPS pursu-
ant to paragraph 12 of this Declaration. 
Id.  
 227. Id. para. 45.  
 228. Id. para. 46 (“Issues related to the extension of the protection of GIs 
provided for in Article 23 to products other than wines and spirits will be ad-
dressed in the Council for TRIPS, which shall report to the Trade Negotia-
tions Committee, established under paragraph 46 of this Declaration, by the 
end of 2002 for appropriate action.”). 
 229. See Doha Work Programme, Decision Adopted by the General Council 
on 1 August 2004,  WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004) (Doc #04-3297), at 2, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple. 
The (General) Council requests the Director-General to continue with 
his consultative process on all outstanding implementation issues 
under paragraph 12(b) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, including 
 
File: Martin Macro 122704.doc Created on: 12/27/2004 1:35 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:36 PM 
2004] GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 175 
A. The Importance of GI Protection to Developing Countries May 
Serve as a Catalyst to Further Negotiation 
It is apparent from recent debates that developing countries 
are becoming aware of the importance of GIs as instruments 
that contribute to the development of their economies.230  Al-
though these countries might have shown greater interest in 
this subject during the Uruguay Round,231 lamentably, they did 
not understand the importance of an effective system of GI pro-
tection to defending their cultural, technical and traditional 
  
on issues related to the extension of the protection of geographical in-
dications provided for in Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement to prod-
ucts other than wines and spirits, if need be by appointing Chairper-
sons of concerned WTO bodies as his Friends and/or by holding dedi-
cated consultations.  The Director-General shall report to the TNC 
(Trade Negotiations Committee) and the General Council no later 
than May 2005.  The Council shall review progress and take any ap-
propriate action no later than July 2005. 
Id. 
 230. Compare Heald, supra note 11, at 656 with E. Durán & C. Michalopou-
los, Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries in the WTO Millen-
nium Round, 2 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 860 (1999).  Heald asserts that in-
creasing protection of GIs will stimulate the exports from developing countries 
in agricultural and crafts products under the identification of an exclusive GI. 
In this respect, he mentions the success that is experienced in the U.S. market 
with Chilean wine.  On the other hand, Durán and Michalopoulos assert that 
there is no evidence that all developing countries will benefit from an ex-
tended protection of GIs because this will depend on whether the country is a 
producer of the merchandise whose GI is protected.   
 231. During the Uruguay Round, Switzerland showed great interest in 
protecting GIs for crafts products such as “Swiss Made” for clocks or the image 
of the Matterhorn for chocolates, see Communication from Switzerland, 
NG11/W/73, in Negotiating Group on TRIPS, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 
May 14–16, 1990, Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG11/21 (June 22, 1990) 
(Doc. #90-0360), para. 41, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search. 
asp?searchmode=simple.  Some developing countries also rejected limiting the 
additional protection to wines and spirits, wanted the protection system to 
cover products of interest to their economies such as coffee, tea or tobacco.  
See, e.g., WTO, Note by the Secretariat, Meeting of the Negotiating Group, 
MTN.GNG/NG11/28 (Nov. 29, 1990) (Doc. #90-0713), available at http:// 
docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  Unfortunately, how-
ever, most of these countries did not understand the importance that the sys-
tem could have in defending its cultural, technical and traditional patrimony, 
and let the opportunity go.  Because of that, these countries will have to make 
concessions to take up such negotiations again at the present time.  
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patrimonies.232  As a result, these countries now will likely be 
forced to make concessions in order to begin the negotiations 
again.  Even so, pressure exerted by these countries to establish 
the registration system for GIs and for extension can certainly 
advance the negotiations.  
B. Geographical Indications and Traditional Knowledge 
Another factor which could influence the negotiations on the 
improvement of GI protection is the pressure exerted by some 
developing countries to establish a mechanism for protection of 
traditional knowledge within the framework of intellectual 
property.233  These Members place great value in the contribu-
tion to development objectives that protection of this knowledge 
can make.234  The use of GIs for products of indigenous and local 
  
 232. See generally Downes, supra note 156, at 268–73 (arguing that intellec-
tual property rights hurt the traditional economies of developing countries, 
but that GIs may be an intellectual property right more advantageous to their 
developing economies).  
 233. In a Communication from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and 
Peru, these countries define traditional knowledge as:  
Innovations, creations and cultural expressions generated or pre-
served by its present possessors, who may be defined and identified 
as individuals or whole communities, natural or legal persons, who 
are holders of rights.  The economic, commercial and cultural value of 
this traditional knowledge for its possessors warrants and justifies a 
legitimate interest that this knowledge be recognized as subject mat-
ter of intellectual property.  This expectation on the part of those con-
cerned that their traditional knowledge should be given legal recogni-
tion has found expression in an increasing number of national, re-
gional and international forums, and is quite as legitimate as the ex-
pectations which in the past justified the recognition of the new sub-
jects of intellectual property that were mentioned above by way of ex-
ample. 
WTO Council for TRIPS, Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b), Proposal 
on Protection of the Intellectual Property Rights Relating to the Traditional 
Knowledge of Local and Indigenous Communities, IP/C/W/165 (Nov. 3, 1999) 
(Doc. #99-4753), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search 
mode=simple. 
 234. Apart from development objectives, WTO Members have alleged some 
other reasons to remedy these problems about the protection of traditional 
knowledge.  These are, among others, a common economic interest, in the 
sense that traditional knowledge is a valuable global resource and, hence, 
international efforts to secure its protection should be actively supported.  See, 
e.g., WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, IP/C/M/32 (Aug. 23, 2001) 
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(Doc. #01-4090), paras. 134, 136, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ 
gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments by Indonesian and Venezue-
lan representatives, respectively).  More specifically, it has been argued that 
traditional knowledge has the potential of being translated into commercial 
benefits by providing leads for the development of useful products and proc-
esses, in particular in the pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors, saving 
time and cost for the biotechnology industry.  WTO Council for TRIPS, Min-
utes of Meeting, IP/C/M/28 (Nov. 23, 2000) (Doc. #00-5002), para. 136, avail-
able at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (com-
ments by the Brazilian representative) [hereinafter Minutes of Sept. 21–22, 
2000 Meeting]; WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Council of 
TRIPS, Submission by India, Protection of Biodiversity and Traditional 
Knowledge – The Indian Experience, IP/C/W/198 (July 14, 2000) (Doc #00-
2889), available at http://www.docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?search 
mode=simple.  For these reasons, it is in the common interest of mankind to 
provide conditions that would be favorable to the preservation of traditional 
knowledge and the continuing vitality of the peoples and communities which 
generate and develop it.  See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, 
IP/C/M/30 (June.1, 2001) (Doc. #01-2746), paras. 153, 184, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments by 
Venezuelan and Ecuador representatives, respectively).  Other reasons are 
based on equity: given the important economic value of traditional knowledge, 
the holders of traditional knowledge should share in the economic benefits 
derived from that knowledge.  WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from 
Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Peru, Review of the Provisions of 
Article 27.3(b), Proposal on Protection of the Intellectual Property Rights Relat-
ing to the Traditional Knowledge of Local and Indigenous Communities, 
IP/C/W/165 (Nov. 3, 1999) (Doc #99-4753), available at http://docson 
line.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  Given that TRIPS requires 
countries with traditional and indigenous communities to provide intellectual 
property protection for a broad range of subject matters, including new ones 
such as plant varieties, biological materials, layout designs and computer 
software, it is only equitable that traditional knowledge should be given legal 
recognition.  Id.; WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from  Cuba, Hon-
duras, Paraguay and Venezuela, Review of Implementation of the Agreement 
under Article 71.1, Proposal on Protection of the Intellectual Property Rights of 
the Traditional Knowledge of Local and Indigenous Communities, IP/C/W/166 
(Nov. 5, 1999) (Doc. #99-4791), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_ 
search.asp?searchmode=simple.  These countries also have raised an argu-
ment for food security, pointing out that local farming communities have over 
the years developed knowledge systems for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity, including through the selection and breeding of 
plant varieties.  The well-established practices of saving, sharing and replant-
ing seeds sustain these communities and ensure their food security.  See, e.g., 
Minutes of Sept. 21–22, 2000 Meeting, supra note 234, at para. 142 (comments 
by the Kenya representative); WTO Council for TRIPS, Communication from 
Mauritius on behalf of the African Group, Review of the Provisions of Article 
27.3(b),  IP/C/W/206 (Sept. 20, 2000) (Doc #00-3760), available at 
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communities’ traditional knowledge could be valuable tools235 for 
such communities seeking to gain economic benefits from their 
traditional knowledge or to prevent its objectionable commercial 
use by outsiders.236  GIs respond to certain indigenous concerns 
more effectively than do other intellectual property rights.237  In 
particular, rights to control GIs can be maintained in perpetu-
ity; they do not confer a monopoly right over the use of certain 
  
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple.  Finally, envi-
ronmental protection is suggested as a reason to use GIs to protect traditional 
knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities because traditional 
knowledge is central to their ability to operate in an environmentally sustain-
able way and to conserve genetic and other natural resources.  Protection of 
traditional knowledge is therefore, according to these countries, closely linked 
to the protection of the environment.  See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of 
Meeting, IP/C/M/30 (June.1, 2001) (Doc. #01-2746), para. 184, available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (comments Ec-
uador representatives).  
 235. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalization of Intellectual Property: 
New Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 929, 960 (2002) (noting that the example of GIs show 
that, in certain cases, rights can be granted to “representatives” of a group or 
a community); WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property 
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Second Session, 
Survey on Existing Forms of Intellectual Property Protection for Traditional 
Knowledge - Preliminary Analysis and Conclusions, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/2/9 
(Dec. 3, 2001) (stating that GIs could be used to afford adequate legal protec-
tion of traditional knowledge, including indigenous designs, and various ex-
pressions of folklore), available at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details 
.jsp?doc_id=1994. 
 236. To date, the debate on intellectual property rights and biodiversity has 
focused on patents and on plant breeders’ rights.  Downes, supra note 156, at 
269.  However, the potential value of GIs warrants greater attention.  See, 
e.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD, CAN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT PROTECT BIOLOGICAL AND 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY? 20–23 (African Centre for Technology Studies, Biopolicy 
International Series No. 19, 1997).   
 237. Survey of Existing Forms of Intellectual Property Protection for Tradi-
tional Knowledge, supra note 235.  In the WTO, the view has been expressed 
that under certain circumstances GIs could be a particularly important way of 
protecting traditional knowledge.  For example, the European Community has 
stated that in the context of traditional knowledge, geographical indications 
could play a complementary role in protecting traditional products under cer-
tain circumstances.  See WTO Council for TRIPS, Minutes of Meeting, 
IP/C/M/32 (Aug. 23, 2001) (Doc. #01-4090), para. 136 (comments by Venezue-
lan representatives), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp? 
searchmode=simple. 
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information, but simply limit the class of people who may use a 
specific symbol.238  
The concession of patents or other intellectual property rights 
to people other than populations where the traditional knowl-
edge originated has preoccupied more and more countries.239  
They are just beginning to demand the establishment of inter-
national measures of protection.  Considering that most of these 
products are made following traditional methods which enjoy a 
quality, reputation, or other characteristic that can be attrib-
uted to their geographical origin, these products could benefit 
from GI protection; such protection could, at least, play a com-
plementary role in their protection.240  It would be worthwhile to 
explore the role that GIs could play in promoting the goals of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity,241 which recognizes the 
existence of defined geographical areas that require regulation 
  
 238. See Downes, supra note 156, at 271 (noting that GIs are designed to 
reward goodwill and reputation created or built up by a group of producers 
over many years and in some cases over centuries).  
 239. The Basmati case is a good example of granting a patent to people 
other than the populations that originated the knowledge.  Basmati is a varie-
ty of rice from the Punjab provinces of India and Pakistan.  The rice is a slen-
der, aromatic long grain variety that originated in this region and is a major 
export crop for both countries.  Annual basmati exports are worth about $300 
million, and represent the livelihood of thousands of farmers.  The “Battle for 
Basmati” started in 1997 when the U.S. rice breeding firm RiceTec Inc. was 
awarded a patent (US5663484) relating to plants and seeds, seeking a mono-
poly on various rice lines, including some having characteristics similar to 
Basmati lines.  Concerned about the potential effect on exports, India reques-
ted a re-examination of this patent in 2000.  The patentee, in response to this 
request, withdrew a number of claims including those covering basmati type 
lines.  Further claims were also withdrawn following concerns raised by the 
USPTO.  The dispute has, however, moved on from the patent to the misuse of 
the name “Basmati.”  In some countries the term “Basmati” can be applied 
only to the long grain aromatic rice grown in India and Pakistan, while in 
others it is considered generic.  For additional information on this case, see 
JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 272–73 (2001). 
 240. GIs are especially suitable for use by indigenous and local communities 
since they are based upon collective traditions and a collective decision-
making process, protect and reward traditions while allowing evolution, em-
phasize the relationships between human cultures and their local land and 
environment, are not freely transferable from one owner to another, and can 
be maintained as long as the collective tradition is maintained.  
 241. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818. 
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to aid in conservation.  The original products of these areas242 
could be classified as GIs if the producers decide to link their 
collective norms and connected traditional knowledge to the 
conservation.243  The creation of GIs could bring economic re-
wards to communities seeking to market products based upon 
sustainable, traditional production practices.  
Notable in this respect are observations of WIPO’s intergov-
ernmental committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Re-
sources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore that some forms 
of intellectual property rights cover the content of knowledge, 
others a specific expression, and others a distinctive sign or 
  
 242. One example of indigenous peoples’ use of identification of origin as a 
tool to protect cultural forms and their use comes from the southwestern re-
gion of the United States.  There, artisans of several Native American tribes 
earn as much as $800 million annually from commercial sales of arts and 
crafts.  For instance, the distinctive styles of Pueblo pottery, silver jewelry, 
and other items such as drums are well known.  Styles and designs are con-
sidered a cultural heritage.  In Zuni, a design may be the property of a certain 
family and no person outside that family has the right to use it.  These in-
digenous communities were concerned that non-indigenous producers were 
using non-traditional methods to produce similar products that they passed 
off as indigenous traditional goods.  In response, the state of New Mexico en-
acted the Indian Arts and Crafts Protection Law.  The law places a duty on 
retailers of native arts and crafts to investigate whether goods are produced 
by indigenous persons by hand using natural materials.  Only if a good passes 
this test can it be labeled "an authentic, Indian, hand-made piece."  Contro-
versy continues because the law does not address whether goods are produced 
by traditional methods.  Although this example is unrelated to biodiversity, it 
offers significant lessons for indigenous control of traditional knowledge.  See 
Sandra Lee Pinel & Michael J. Evans, Tribal Sovereignty and the Control of 
Knowledge, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, A 
SOURCEBOOK 41, 44–48 (Tom Greaves ed., 1994).  Through similar mecha-
nisms, there may be opportunities to gain benefits from products of biological 
resources produced through traditional methods or based on traditional 
knowledge.  See generally DAVID R. DOWNES & SARAH A. LAIRD, INNOVATIVE 
MECHANISMS FOR SHARING BENEFITS OF BIODIVERSITY AND RELATED 
KNOWLEDGE: CASE STUDIES ON GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS AND TRADEMARKS 
(UNCTAD Biotrade Initiative, The Center for International and Environ-
mental Law ed., 1999), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ 
pubbaw.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2004). 
 243. DOWNES & LAIRD, supra note 242, at 10 (“[M]ore than other major types 
of intellectual property, geographical indications have features that respond to 
norms for use and management of bioresources and traditional knowledge 
that are characteristic of the culture of many indigenous and local econo-
mies.”).       
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symbol.244  Thus, the possibility of a product being protected by 
these complementary, though overlapping, instruments of intel-
lectual property is very real.  By way of example, consider 
handicrafts: their technical content may be protected as a tech-
nical idea, while GIs could protect their cultural value.  One 
important finding of the Committee’s “Review of Existing Intel-
lectual Property Protection of Traditional Knowledge” was that 
while many countries considered few intellectual property in-
struments suitable for protecting traditional knowledge, some 
looked favorably upon GIs.245  
VII. CONCLUSION 
What is the best way to protect, at an international level, the 
names of well-known products, such as Rioja wine or Idaho Po-
tatoes, which have reputations known by consumers around the 
world?  Do current international rules provide sufficient safe-
guards, or should governments implement another system of 
more effective protection?  These are the questions that need to 
be solved by WTO Members within the scope of the Built-In 
Agenda of the TRIPS Agreement.  
The analysis of the TRIPS Agreement’s provisions empha-
sizes that it offers legal instruments for the protection of future 
GIs while also protecting the illegal use of GIs already in use 
before the TRIPS Agreement went into effect.246  Although these 
  
 244. See WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Fifth Session, Over-
view of Activities and Outcomes of the Intergovernmental Committee, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/12 (Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/docu 
ments/en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_12.pdf. 
 245. See WIPO, Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Third Session, Re-
view of Existing Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/7 (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.wipo.int/docum 
ents/en/meetings/2002/igc/pdf/grtkfic3_7.pdf.   
 246. It could be said that the “sins of the past,” the expression so often used 
to talk about the first legislative developments relative to GI protection, still 
have not been purified.  This expression has often been used to describe the 
incapacity of the first international legislative developments to prevent GIs 
which had properly functioned to indicate that a product came from a certain 
place, but were later transformed in another country into a generic designa-
tion of a type of product.  This expression is mentioned often by scholars.  See, 
e.g., GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, supra 
note 60, at 203; Albrecht Krieger, La revision de l’Arrangement de Lisbonne 
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provisions undoubtedly represent a considerable improvement 
in international protection with respect to that which existed 
under WIPO, TRIPS did not create a complete system for the 
international protection of GIs.  Quite the contrary, these provi-
sions continue generating considerable legal uncertainty.  This 
is also true with regard to the existing imbalance between pro-
tection levels, leading to an additional level of GI protection for 
wines and spirits, as compared to other products.   
For these reasons, the work on TRIPS is far from finished 
and the debate between new and old world countries continues 
to be divisive in the furtherance of TRIPS’ goal of protecting 
intellectual property and global economic interests.  By virtue of 
the program incorporated into the text of the Agreement, the 
provisions relative to the protection of GIs do not constitute a 
body of static norms; thus, the Agreement must evolve towards 
a more effective model of protection.  
However, until now, debates in the TRIPS Council have been 
deadlocked.  Different Members are divided over the nature, 
reach, effects, and coverage of the registration system for GIs.  
With respect to the notification and registration system for GIs, 
the minimalist approach presents the great disadvantage of 
limiting itself to creating a simple database without consistent 
legal effects.  This approach is not of a multilateral character 
and does not help facilitate WTO protection for GIs.  The pro-
posal is silent on the need for elements of proof or an opposition 
procedure — elements indispensable to a future multilateral 
register.  Therefore, this system risks creating more confusion 
than clarity about which products should be given Article 23-
level protection.  
The maximalist approach, as represented in the EC Proposal, 
is better suited to achieve the objective of facilitating the pro-
tection of GIs as prescribed in Article 23.4.  The system pro-
posed would be truly multilateral,as mandated in Article 23.4, 
ecause it would have legal effects on all Members.  It would 
thus facilitate protection already available under the TRIPS 
  
concernant la protection des appellations d’origine, 9 LA PROPRIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE 
399, 406 (1974) (Krieger cites to the term “péchés du passé” (“sins of the past”) 
but attributes the expression to Moser v. Filseck); Knaak, supra note 40,at 116; 
Dawson, supra note 147, at 590 (“this must be seen as a bargaining position, 
not a crime and still less a sin.). 
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Agreement and would, therefore, favor legitimate users of GIs, 
consumers, and administrations alike.  It would also guarantee 
legal certainty as one of the key elements of the multilateral 
system.  From my point of view, it is clear that only a meaning-
ful and truly multilateral system could fulfill the mandate that 
had been contained in the Built-In Agenda of TRIPS.  Neverthe-
less, some countries have shown their opposition to the latter 
proposal by alleging that this would demand creation of an 
overly complex system. 
Opinions are also divided with respect to the extension of GI 
protection provided under Article 23 to products other than 
wines and spirits.  For some countries, the legal system pro-
vided under the TRIPS Agreement is insufficient.  Moreover, 
additional protection granted for wines and spirits constitutes 
arbitrary discrimination against all other products.  But, for 
another group of countries, the additional protection granted 
only for certain types of products reflects the balance reached in 
the multilateral trade negotiations.  
Nevertheless, the apparent paralysis that has surrounded the 
debate in the TRIPS Council could change soon.  GIs are on the 
agenda of WTO trade negotiations, which establishes a precise 
negotiating schedule for the creation of the registration system 
and the expansion of additional protection for products other 
than wine and spirits, assuming that the necessary consensus is 
reached.  This has been recently reaffirmed by the General 
Council of the WTO. 
In addition, when approaching the negotiations of the Built-
In Agenda, the TRIPS Council must consider the repercussions 
from the perspective of commerce and development in develop-
ing countries.  The subject of GIs is of particular interest to de-
veloping countries because of the importance to those countries 
of the remunerative marketing of their agricultural production.  
Additionally, the assistance of GI protection to traditional 
knowledge would be vital. Undoubtedly, expansion of the full 
scope of the TRIPS GI regime is an effective demonstration of 
the relevance of the Agreement to their economic circum-
stances.  Resistance to this extension may communicate an un-
fortunate message to those countries about the political real-
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politik of the international intellectual property rights regime.247  
Therefore, WTO members should accept their responsibility to 
provide greater protection for GIs.  By doing so, they will assist 
in ensuring that TRIPS remains an effective multinational 
treaty by setting an international example for compliance. 
 
  
 247. See Michel Blakeney, Proposals for the International Regulations of 
Geographical Indications, 4 J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 629, 652 (2001). 
